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ATTEMPTS TO MONOPOLIZE-SPECIFIC
INTENT AS ANTITRUST'S GHOST
IN THE MACHINE
Barry E. Hawkt
Increasing attention is being focused upon the antimonopoly
provisions of section 2 of the Sherman Act ' as an insufficiently used
antitrust enforcement weapon.2 While most of the literature is directed
toward the completed offense of actual monopolization,3 the last fifteen
years have also witnessed an accelerating resort by private plaintiffs to
claims of attempt to monopolize in which the challenged conduct is
unilateral, thus not subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act,4 and is
engaged in by a firm not possessing the monopoly power necessary to
sustain a claim of actual monopolization.5 This Article analyzes the
courts' rationales in disposing of attempt claims and describes the case
results in terms of certain recurring fact situations."
t Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University. B.A. 1962, Fordham University;
LL.B. 1965, University of Virginia.
1 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
2 Section 2 prohibits actual monopolization, combinations, or conspiracies to monop-
olize and attempts to monopolize. The distinction between conspiracies to monopolize and
concerted attempts is sometimes blurred in the decisions, particularly when broad instruc-
tions are given to the jury. See, e.g., Mount Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283
F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1968), af'd per curiam, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969). The basis for
the distinction is that the gravamen of the conspiracy offense is the agreement of the
defendants to combine together, while an unlawful motive or purpose is emphasized as
the gravamen of an attempt to monopolize. See United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 245
F. Supp. 737, 739 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). Conspiracy to monopolize covers a broader range of
conduct because there is no dangerous probability test-whether a dangerous probability
exists that actual monopolization will result from the defendant's conduct-and specific
intent either is not required or is subject to a lesser standard. See United States v. Con-
solidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961).
Attempts to monopolize may be either unilateral or concerted. Because most courts
have treated concerted attempts in the same manner as unilateral attempts, the attempt
offense will be examined as a single category.
3 For example, it has been argued that § 2 can be used to challenge oligopolies as
"shared monopolies." See Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory
Policies, 82 HARv. L. Rrv. 1207, 1226-31 (1969).
4 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
5 For example, termination of a distributorship by a manufacturer has been fre-
quently alleged to constitute an attempt to monopolize the local distribution of the
manufacturer's product. See note 184 and accompanying text infra.
6 Proposed formulations of the attempt to monopolize offense vary markedly. Most
commentators prefer to propose changes in the law rather than to analyze existing case
law. Some writers have approved Justice Holmes's classic definition in Swift & Co. v.
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The attempt offense has been a highly unpredictable enforcement
weapon because it is perhaps the least judicially defined offense under
either the Sherman or Clayton Acts.7 Nor has it been a powerful
enforcement weapon, for usually it has added very little to plaintiffs'
recovery or relief.8 The vagaries of its formulation, however, permit
the attempt claim to lurk quietly in the pleadings and instructions
until seized upon by the jury as a basis for granting treble damages.
Although the classic elements of the attempt offense articulated in
Swift & Co. v. United States9-"specific intent" to monopolize plus a
"dangerous probability" that a monopoly will result from the defen-
dant's conduct-are often recited in opinions, they mask a myriad of
conflicting rationales. 0 The vagaries arise primarily because attempt
claims often reveal fundamental ambiguities in the economic and polit-
ical goals and premises underlying the antitrust laws. Even assuming a
general consensus on economic goals and theories, a consensus which
does not exist, the basic and exceedingly difficult task of determining
United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905): "specific intent" plus "dangerous probability." See
Hibner, Attempts To Monopolize: A Concept in Search of Analysis, 34 ANTiTRusr L.J. 165,
173-77 (1967); Smith, Attempt To Monopolize: Its Elements and Their Definition, 27 GEo.
WAH. L. REv. 227, 230-31 (1958). Others have proposed a stricter standard covering a
broader range of practices. See P. AREEmA, ANTrrusr aNALYsis 177-78 (1967) (specific
intent and market power may be alternative requirements which vary in inverse propor-
tion to offensiveness of conduct); Blecher, Attempts To Monopolize Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act: "Dangerous Probability" of Monopolization Within the "Relevant
Market," 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 222 (1969) ("exclusionary" intent to preclude plaintiff's
access to portion of industry's business; no dangerous probability requirement); Turner,
Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARv. L. Rv. 281, 203-08, 31315 (1956)
(specific intent, established by coercive conduct or absence of normal business purpose);
Note, Prosecutions for Attempts To Monopolize: The Relevance of the Relevant Market,
42 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 110, 119 (1967) (specific intent alone; neither dangerous probability nor
relevant market requirement); Note, Attempt To Monopolize: The Offense Redefined,
1969 UTAH L. REV. 704, 715-17 (conduct that has had, or if unchecked will have, effect
of setting another's price or excluding competitor without legitimate business purpose,
plus coercive use of economic power).
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1970).
s See notes 184-86 infra.
9 196 U.S. 375, 296 (1905).
10 Some courts, when confronted with an attempt claim, limit themselves to a mere
recital of the Swift formulation; others simply dismiss the attempt claim without any
reference to either a test or precedent. See, e.g., Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co.,
415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970); Walker Distrib. Co. v.
Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 976 (1966).
Moreover, there are inconsistencies in definition and emphasis. Compare Union Leader
Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1959), modified,
284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961), with Southern Blowpipe




when business practices are anticompetitive remains." Moreover, there
is an increasing feeling among some economists that neither classical
nor neo-classical economic theory presently provides clear, precise
criteria upon which to evaluate anticompetitive impact.' 2 Furthermore,
political policies, such as deconcentration of economic power 3 and
1 See Bernhard, Divergent Concepts of Competition in Antitrust Cases, 15 AN'n-
vausr BuLL. 43, 50-51 (1970). See also United States v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964,
1011-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (Judge Learned Hand's distinction between "hard" and "soft"
competition).
The problem is due in part to the fact that successful competition necessarily results
in harm to competitors. See Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 104 F. Supp. 796,
780 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aff'd, 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
The evaluation of anticompetitive conduct on the basis of economic criteria alone is
complicated by long-term and short-term economic considerations and by the fundamental
question of whether competition should be defined primarily from the perspective of
competitors or consumers. Professors Blake and Jones, in discussing business motivation,
appear to condemn business practices "that do nothing to improve resource utilization
or efficiency or to increase consumer satisfaction in relation to the price paid." Blake &
Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 377, 385 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Blake & Jones]. Even economists such as Schumpeter, who view capitalism (and compe-
tition) as a process of creative destruction, concede that some business practices may be
injurious to long-term economic development. See, e.g., J. ScHumprmER, CAPrrALISM, So-
CIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 91 (3d ed. 1950). The often asserted single standard of "efficiency"
or "efficient allocation of scarce resources" is rarely a sufficient and workable standard
whether or not economics is the sole relevant factor. Compare Blake & Jones 385, with Bork
& Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 863, 370 (1965). There is certainly
no simple and unqualified relationship between antitrust policy and economic efficiency.
See Blake &- Jones 394-98. For a discussion of a proposed role for economic analysis in
antitrust enforcement, see P. Ascir, ECONoMIc THEORY AND THE AN'nRusr DILEMMA 102-30,
223-27 (1970).
12 See, e.g., R. HEmBRONER, BmwEEN CAPrrrAwSM AND SOcIALIsm 165-92 (1970). Classical
economics itself contains a basic paradox in its approach to competition in that unreg-
ulated market conduct (total laissez-faire) would lead not to perfect competition but
rather would provide "an opportunity for the stronger to liquidate the weaker or reduce
them to a subordinate position." C. FURTADO, D VELOPMENT AND UNDERmEVELOPMENT 98
(1964).
13 Although these political goals may be deplored or dismissed as mere rhetoric (see,
e.g., Bork & Bowman, supra note 11, at 369-70), their existence has undoubtedly influenced
judicial resolution of major antitrust issues. For example, in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427-29 (2d Cir. 1945), Judge Learned Hand stated:
It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system of
small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill and character,
to one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a
few ....
• . . Throughout the history of [the antitrust] statutes it has been con-
stantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for
its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small
units which can effectively compete with each other.
This political goal was also enunciated by Justice Douglas, dissenting in United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 536 (1948):
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protection of each trader's opportunity to do business, 14 underlie the
antitrust laws. These political goals may in some cases be inconsistent
with the purely economic criteria applied in a particular case. Disposi-
tions of attempt claims also reveal that courts are relying upon a third
policy consideration. This consideration is an ethical evaluation of
business conduct in light of an inarticulated and undefined code of
business ethics or a fairness standard, employing conclusory valuative
terms such as "unfair," "legitimate business purpose," "predatory," and
"exclusionary." 5
The ultimate issue must be resolved by identifying and reconciling
these various criteria and policies. The aim of this Article, however, is
more modest. The Article will demonstrate that the specific intent
requirement is an improper vehicle for the resolution of the fundamen-
tal policy decisions involved. It is the thesis of this Article that the
essential characteristic of the offense of attempted monopolization is
an evaluation of the defendant's conduct in light of the market struc-
ture and that this evaluation more often than not rests upon in-
articulated and perhaps purely personal judicial views of business
ethics as well as upon imprecise economic and political considerations.
The specific intent requirement impedes this conduct evaluation by
connoting a subjective intention to monopolize existing in the mind
of the actor. As will be seen, specific intent to monopolize has been
inferred only from conduct which was previously determined to be
undesirable. 6 Thus, specific intent to monopolize, despite its con-
Industrial power should be decentralized. It should be scattered into many hands
so that the fortunes of the people will not be dependent on the whim or caprice,
the political prejudices, the emotional stability of a few self-appointed men.
14 Professors Blake and Jones articulate these political goals as minimizing politi-
cal interference with self-policing markets and protecting and enlarging individual freedom
and opportunity. See Blake & Jones 382-84; Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional
Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUm. L. REV. 422, 422-36 (1965).
15 See Times-Picayune Publ. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 597 (1953) ("pre-
dominantly motivated by legitimate business aims" and "bold, relentless and predatory
commercial behavior"); I-iland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969). This ethical code may overlap or parallel one's attitude
toward "hard" and "soft" competition. Ethical criteria rest on the premise that competi-
tion is a game in which there are certain rules and whose object is not to win at all costs.
Lawyers and economists often resolve differently questions of the anticompetitive ef-
fects of certain practices. As pointed out by Professor Dewey, lawyers often condemn as
immoral or unethical practices which an economist might sanction, at least on economic
grounds. For example, an economist might argue that commercial bribery promotes
efficiency and competition by exacerbating suspicion among businessmen and by speeding
dissemination of information. See D. DEWEY, THE THEORY OF IMPERFEar COMPETITION: A
RAmDCAL RECONSrUCTION 122-23 (1969).
16 See notes 230-31 and accompanying text infra.
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notation of a state of mind of the actor, is invariably based upon an
evaluation of conduct.
An unnerving number of opinions concerning attempts to monop-
olize fail to articulate the criteria which have been utilized in evaluat-
ing the defendant's conduct; one often gets the uncomfortable feeling
that intuition alone is at work. The specific intent requirement which
masks the inarticulated and intuitive bases for decisions should be
eliminated and replaced by a formulation which focuses the attention
of courts and juries upon their proper task of conduct evaluation. 17
I
CLAIMS OF ATrEMPT To MONOPOLIZE IN THE SUPREME COURT
Few Supreme Court opinions have been addressed to the attempt
offense.' 8 In 1905, Justice Holmes, in Swift, enunciated what has be-
come the classic formulation:
Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result
which the law seeks to prevent-for instance, the monopoly-but
require further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to
bring that result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is necessary
in order to produce a dangerous probability that it will happen.19
The precedential value of the Swift formulation is subject to a
17 See notes 226-32 and accompanying text infra.
18 Two points should be kept in mind when examining these decisions: (1) the extent
of the Court's adherence to the Swift formulation, and (2) a comparison of the Court's ap-
proach to attempt claims with the approaches taken by lower courts, particularly with
respect to specific intent.
19 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). At least one court has interpreted this language to require
specific intent only, reasoning that it is the fact of specific intent which brings about the
dangerous probability. See Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). This broad reading was arguably rejected by Justice Holmes in
the Swift opinion:
Not every act that may be done with intent to produce an unlawful result is un-
lawful, or constitutes an attempt. It is a question of proximity and degree. The
distinction between mere preparation and attempt is well known in the criminal
law. The same distinction is recognized in cases like the present.
196 U.S. at 402 (citation omitted). But see note 21 infra. The "specific intent" plus "dan-
gerous probability" formulation is a restatement of the test for criminal attempt enunci-
ated by Holmes in Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 272, 59 N.E. 55, 56 (1901).
The rationale underlying this definition of criminal attempt is that an individual may be
punished only when his actions, in light of his intent, create a danger of harm to society;
this danger arises only when the individual comes very close to consummating the crime.
Id. at 271-72, 59 N.E. at 56; see Note, supra note 6, 1969 UTAH L. RaV. at 709-11 (criticizing
narrow penal interpretation of attempt provision of § 2 as failing to implement broad
social and economic goals of Sherman Act).
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number of contextual limitations. First, the decision provides little
instruction beyond a mere verbalization of the test. The conduct in
Swift was so clearly unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act that
it would satisfy any of the later judicial formulations of the specific
intent requirement.20 Moreover, no analysis of the dangerous probabil-
ity aspect was provided, even though the defendants held sixty percent
of the market.21 Second, the unlawful attempt finding may not have
been strictly necessary to obtain the result. The conduct and market
power of the defendants approached the actual monopolization also
charged in the indictment.22 Third, Justice Holmes's formulation was
developed in response to the defendants' objection to the bill as multi-
farious. Justice Holmes dismissed the objection on the ground that the
scheme as a whole seemed to be within the reach of the law and that
the unity of the plan embraced all the parts.23 Thus, there was a shift in
the opinion from the two-fold classical formulation to the broader con-
cept of a "scheme" or "plan" which brought together all the separate
acts charged in the indictment.
Since Swift only a handful of decisions offer guidance in determin-
ing the Supreme Court's characterization of the attempt offense.24
20 Most of the defendants' practices would be considered per se restraints today: for
example, price-fixing, manipulation of buying prices, bid rigging, output restrictions, black-
listing, and inducement of unlawful rail rebates. All of these practices were alleged in
Swift. See 196 U.S. at 390-93.
21 Swift does not necessarily compel a dangerous probability requirement despite
Holmes's clarifying statement that intent alone is insufficient and that a "question of
proximity and degree" is involved. Id. at 402; see note 19 supra. This clarifying language
was directed primarily toward the scope of the injunctive decree and not toward the
definition of an attempt to monopolize. Holmes was examining whether the "lawful" con-
duct or combinations (rebates) could be enjoined apart from the general common scheme.
196 U.S. at 402. He concluded that such conduct, lawful by itself, may be enjoined when
it is an important part of the common scheme. Id.
22 The defendant's share of the market (60%) was substantial market power if not
an actual monopoly under the percentage guidelines later developed by the courts in
actual monopolization cases. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945). Indeed, it is not dear whether the Court viewed the case primarily as
a concerted attempt to monopolize or as a conspiracy to monopolize. The Court appears
to have viewed the indictment as a charge of a single common conspiracy to monopolize.
Although Holmes did make a distinction between attempt and conspiracy to monopolize,
his reliance on the common plan or scheme rationale blurs that distinction. 196 U.S. at
395.
23 196 U.S. at 395-96.
24 Attempts to monopolize were charged in United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
221 U.S. 106 (1911), and Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The opinions
in both cases, however, were quite vague as to the distinction between concerted monopo-
lization and attempts to monopolize. The importance of the Standard Oil decision is its
statement that § 2 of the Sherman Act complements § 1 by prohibiting conduct which,
although not violative of § I, still constitutes an attempt to monopolize. 221 U.S. at 61.
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These few decisions reveal two entirely different conceptions of the
claim. One is represented by the classic Swift formulation. A second
standard or conception has been applied in cases involving misuse of
monopoly power held in one market to foreclose competition in a
second, nonmonopoly market. This second formulation-misuse of
monopoly power-was most explicitly developed in United States v.
Griftith.25 In Griffith, a group of motion picture exhibitors owned the
only theatres in sixty-two percent of the geographic markets where they
owned or had an interest in such theatres ("closed towns"). In the
remaining towns in which they owned theatres they competed with
other exhibitors ("open towns"). The Court held that circuit buying
by the exhibitors violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.26 The
Court reasoned that operating the sole theatre in a town or having
,The Court further stated that an intent to monopolize is necessary for a violation of § 2
and that intent may be inferred from conduct. Id. at 75-77. But no distinction was made
among the intent requirements of the different § 2 offenses.
Standard Oil and American Tobacco are excellent examples of decisions in which the
attempt may be said to merge into the completed offense of actual monopolization. An-
other example of a case in which all § 2 offenses were alleged without separate discussion
or treatment of the attempt claim is Indiana Farmers' Guide Publ. Co. v. Prairie Farmer
Publ. Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934).
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), and American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 US. 781 (1946), provided the first clear differentiations
between the general intent necessary for actual monopolization and the specific intent nec-
essary for attempts. General intent is a very liberal, and easily satisfied, standard; it will
probably be inferred once a court finds the "plus" factors or the conduct which character-
izes the monopolist. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra at 425. The
specific intent to monopolize necessary for the attempt offense, on the other hand, is not
a perfunctory requirement to be as readily inferred. Its actual scope was not defined in
either Alcoa or American Tobacco. Indeed, the American Tobacco defendants were con-
victed on separate counts of violations of § 1-actual monopolization, conspiracy to monop-
olize, and attempt to monopolize-but were not sentenced on the attempt offense because
it was considered merged into the completed offense. 328 U.S. at 783. Consequently, there
was no appeal of the attempt conviction.
The offense of attempt to monopolize was also cited in Walker Process Equip., Inc.
v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177-78 (1965), in which the Court held that
intentional fraud on the Patent Office constituted either actual monopolization or an at-
tempt to monopolize. No distinction was made between the two and the claim was char-
acterized generally under § 2.
25 334 U.S. 100 (1948). Traces of this notion of misuse of monopoly power can, of
course, be found in earlier decisions, particularly those involving vertically integrated in-
dustries. See, e.g., United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); United States v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co., 164 F. 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1908), aff'd, 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
26 The contracts for both the "open" and "dosed" towns were negotiated through
joint agents and were combined into master agreements which had the following common
features: (1) lumping together towns with and without competition, (2) computing the mini-
mum rental on a circuit-wide rather than a film-by-film basis, and (3) providing that
films could be played out of the order of their release rather than at a specific time in a
specified theatre. 334 U.S. at 102-03.
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the exclusive right to exhibit a film constituted monopoly power, and
the use of such power to (1) "foreclose competition," (2) "gain a com-
petitive advantage," or (3) "destroy a competitor" was unlawful. 27 More
precisely, the Court prohibited the use of a strategic position, the
monopoly in one geographic area, to acquire exclusive privileges in a
second geographic area in which there are competitors.28
Griffith is important because it serves as a cornerstone supporting
a large body of precedent condemning, as violative of section 2, misuse
of monopoly power in one market to secure a competitive advantage
in a second market.29 Despite the Griffith Court's emphasis on actual
monopolization, some lower courts have cited Griffith in condemning,
as an unlawful attempt, the use of monopoly power in one market to
obtain a competitive advantage in a second market.8 0
This interpretation was recently reinforced in Otter Tail Power
Co. v. United States,31 in which the Supreme Court relied on Griffith
in affirming a lower court finding that a private electrical utility had
attempted to monopolize by using its dominant position in the whole-
sale market of subtransmission to foreclose the entry of municipalities
into the retail market.82 The Court reasoned that Otter Tail misused
its almost complete monopoly of the subtransmission market33 by
refusing to sell at wholesale or to "wheel" electric power to the munici-
palities within its overall service area.3 4
27 Id. at 107.
28 The Court found that the defendant had used its one-market monopolies as a
trade weapon against its competitors with the result that it had "expanded its empire"
and had used monopoly power to "begat monopoly." Id. at 100.
29 See, e.g., Southern Blowpipe & Roofing Co. v. Chattanooga Gas Co., 860 F.2d 79
(6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 844 (1968); Packaged Programs, Inc. v. Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co., 255 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1958); Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit
Co., 1972 Trade Cas. 73,813 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
30 See notes 161-69 and accompanying text infra. This is partially explained by the
ambiguity of the Griffith opinion and by the fact that the Court reaffirmed the require-
ment of specific intent in attempt cases. See 334 U.S. at 105-06.
81 93 S. Ct. 1022 (1973), aff'g in part, vacating and remanding 831 F. Supp. 54 (D.
Minn. 1971).
32 93 S. Ct. at 1029. The district court also found actual monopolization based on the
same conduct. The Supreme Court also cited Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S.
148 (1951), and Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 278 U.S. 859 (1927),
for the proposition that the "use of monopoly power 'to destroy threatened competition' is
a violation of the 'attempt to monopolize' clause of § 2 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 1029.
33 The Court characterized Otter Tail's position as "dominant." 98 S. Ct. at 1026 n.3.
Although Otter Tail did not have a total monopoly in the subtransmission market, the
Court found that the few rural cooperatives with available generation and subtransmission
services did not "cut significantly into Otter Tail's dominant position in subtransmission."
Id. Otter Tail was also found to have 91% of the various retail natural monopolies ex-
isting in the towns within its overall service area. Id. at 1026.
84 Id. at 1029-80. The district court also found that Otter Tail had initiated litiga-
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Because it invokes Griffith without reference to Swift, Otter Tail
lends valuable support to the proposition that two-market situations
should be subject to a standard different from the more familiar test
governing actual monopolization and attempts to monopolize.85
Meaningful application of the traditional Swift test in Supreme
Court cases is limited to three decisions rendered between 1948 and
1953. In the first of these cases, United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,36
the Court held that the defendant steel manufacturer's vertical and
horizontal acquisition of a steel manufacturer-fabricator, following a
successful bid to acquire a government-owned steel mill, was neither a
restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act nor a concerted
attempt to monopolize the fabricated steel products market.87 The
Court failed even to mention the Swift formulation, merely stating
that the requirement of specific intent to monopolize was not satisfied.38
The Court examined the vertical acquisition in light of the de-
fendant's long history of prior acquisitions (180 before 1920 and
eighteen between 1924 and 1943) and focused upon the defendant's
business reasons for undertaking the most recent acquisition.3 9 Specific
intent was examined in terms of the absence or presence of a "normal
business purpose." 40 The vertical acquisition of the fabricator was
viewed by the Court as a necessary part of a judicially approved ex-
pansion of the eastern-located defendant into the western manufactur-
ing market.41 The Court reasoned that it was a normal business purpose
for a manufacturer entering a new geographic market to protect itself
tion for the purpose of delaying and preventing the establishment of municipal electric
systems. By rendering the municipal bonds to finance such systems unmarketable, Otter
Tail hoped to preserve its dominant position in the sale and transmission of electric
power in the area. See 331 F. Supp. at 61-62. The Court remanded this issue. 93 S. Ct. at
1031.
35 See notes 161-69 and accompanying text infra.
36 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
37 Id. at 507-08.
38 Id. at 520-27. A dangerous probability requirement was not enunciated, although
this was not necessary to the decision. The Court did note a decline in the defendant's mar-
ket shares (id. at 538) which indicates, if only impliedly, that the Court recognized the
continuing existence of the requirement.
39 Id. at 532-33.
40 Id. at 533.
41 Prior to its most recent acquisition, the defendant, an eastern steel manufacturer,
had acquired Geneva, a western steel manufacturer established and operated by the Gov-
ernment during World War Il. The Geneva acqusition, which brought the defendant into
the western manufacturing market for the first time, was hailed by the Court as part of
"the welcome westwvard extension" of eastern steel manufacturers. Id. The Court then
found that the "acquisition of a firm outlet to absorb a portion of Geneva's rolled steel




by acquiring a fabricating outlet in the new market.42 The Court also
relied on evidence that competing eastern manufacturers bidding on
the manufacturing plant had contemplated the acquisition of a fab-
ricator in the event their bid was successful.43
Two conclusions can be drawn from Columbia Steel. First, the
Court did not view specific intent as a subjective state of mind of the
defendant to be inferred merely from its conduct. The intent was
determined from a direct evaluation of the defendant's conduct con-
sidered in the light of anticipated conduct of similarly situated com-
petitors in the industry. The emphasis was not so much on intent or
purpose as it was on normalcy-what is to be expected in a particular
industry. To this extent the Court in Columbia Steel moved toward a
totally objective standard based solely upon the actual trade practices
in an industry. Further, the attempt claim was treated as a mere tag-
along to the section 1 claim. Both claims were resolved similarly for the
same reason-western expansion by the major steel manufacturers was
economically desirable because it brought new competitive vigor to
the western market. 44
The second case, Lorain journal Co. v. United States,45 is the
only Supreme Court case in which an attempt to monopolize was the
sole offense alleged. The Court held that a newspaper's refusal to ac-
cept advertisements from parties who also advertised on a newly es-
tablished local radio station was both an attempt to monopolize and
an attempt to regain a monopoly in the local dissemination of news
and advertising. 46 In finding specific intent, the Court merely repeated
the district court's finding that the purpose of the boycott was the
complete elimination of the radio station as a competitor for local
advertising. 4 The Court also repeated the district court's characteriza-
tion of the defendant's conduct as "bold, relentless, and predatory."
48
42 id.
43 Id. at 503.
44 Id. at 533-34. This interpretation of Columbia Steel is supported by Justice Doug-
las's dissenting opinion which condemned the acquisition and the westward expansion as
undesirable regardless of whether it was motivated by normal business purposes. Id. at
537.
45 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
46 Id. at 149-55. The distinction between these two attempts is not clearly delineated
in the opinion. The boycott was extremely effective because the defendant had the only
newspaper in Lorain and it reached 99% of the families in the town. Advertising in de-
fendant's daily was thus essential to local businessmen for the promotion of their sales.
Id. at 148. The radio station WEOL relied almost entirely on advertising for its income.
Id.
47 Id. at 149-50.
48 Id. at 149.
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Dangerous probability was considered only in rejecting the defendant's
contention that a competitor must actually be eliminated before an
attempt can be established.4 9
Lorain's precedential strength as an attempt decision is weakened
by the defendant's total monopoly position in the newspaper field and
its unquantified but substantial power in the broader market of local
news dissemination. Indeed, Lorain is similar to Griffith since the de-
fendant used monopoly leverage power in one market (a product
market-daily newspapers) to exclude competition in a second market
(local news dissemination and advertising market).50 Lorain differs from
Griffith, however, because in Lorain the two markets were neither
dearly defined nor clearly separate; the Court appeared to view the
newspaper monopoly market as part of a larger market comprising both
local radio and local newspaper advertising.51
The rationale in Lorain may be ambiguous, but the result is hardly
surprising. Presumably, the Lorain Journal Company had a greater
share of this second market than Columbia Steel had of the western
fabrication market. Thus, an even better case could be made against
the newspaper's activities on both the specific intent and dangerous
probability grounds. Specific intent could be inferred from the defen-
dant's conduct under any of the lower court approaches, and dangerous
probability was clearly established. Unfortunately, the opinion is not
as detailed with respect to the attempt offense as one might wish.
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States52 is the third
Supreme Court decision discussing attempts to monopolize. The lower
court finding of an attempt was reversed on the ground that specific
49 The Court impliedly found the dangerous probability requirement satisfied in de-
termining that the radio station had already lost income, that loss of that income was a
major threat to its existence, and that WEOL would be eliminated unless an injunction
against the boycott was issued. Id. at 153. On these findings, the dangerous probability
requirement was certainly satisfied, because continuation of the defendant's conduct would
have eliminated its sole competitor, thus assuring the defendant of a total monopoly. How-
ever, elimination of a single competitor in a more fragmented industry would not neces-
sarily bring about a dangerous probability of monopoly power.
50 The Court quoted the Griffith misuse of monopoly power test. Id. at 154 n.7.
51 "[A] single newspaper, already enjoying a substantial monopoly in its area, violates
the 'attempt to monopolize' dause of § 2 when it uses its monopoly to destroy threatened
competition." Id at 154 (footnote omitted). Determination of the daily newspaper's share of
the larger market would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible; WEOL had just
commenced operations and estimation of potential radio revenues would have been diffi-
cult. Perhaps for this reason the Court flirted with, if it did not actually rely on, the
Griffith misuse rationale, even though such an approach assumes two separate geographic
or product markets.
52 345 US. 594 (1953).
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intent was not established. 3 Dangerous probability was not men-
tioned.5 4 Specific intent was defined as an intent "to destroy competition
or build monopoly" and was said to be inferable from conduct which
had no predominant business motivation.Y5 Four aspects of the defen-
dant's conduct were examined separately. The Court affirmed the
district court's findings that three of these courses of conduct were
predominantly motivated by legitimate business purposes.56 The fourth
activity, adoption of unit rates, was found by the district court to con-
stitute an unlawful tying arrangement under section 1 of the Sherman
Act as well as an unlawful attempt to monopolize under section 2.t 7
The district court expressly found that the unit rates were instituted
in order to, among other unlawful objectives, "substantially diminish
the competitive vigor of the Item." 8 The Supreme Court reversed this
finding, holding that the unit rates were predominantly motivated by
a legitimate business purpose.59
The Court did not discuss legitimate purpose as a separate test
under section 2. Instead, it equated specific intent under that section
with one of the elements (business purpose) of the rule of reason ap-
proach under section 1-whether the purpose and effect of the con-
duct in question gives rise to an unlawful restraint of trade.6 0 The
53 Id. The defendant published the only morning newspaper and one of two evening
newspapers in New Orleans. Each of the defendant's papers had approximately 40% of
the total classified and general lineage in the area. The sole competitor had 20% of the
remaining available lineage. Nevertheless, the Court, in a five-to-four decision, reversed
the district court's civil injunction against use of unit rates for advertising in the defen-
dant's papers. It found no per se unlawful tying arrangement, no unreasonable restraint
of trade under § 1, and no attempt to monopolize. Id. at 613-15, 622-28.
64 Since the defendant had approximately 80% of the market, the dangerous proba-
bility requirement was satisfied, at least to the extent monopoly power alone, as distin-
guished from monopolization, was the relevant consideration.
55 345 U.S. at 626.
66 First, the defendant's acquisition of the evening newspaper in 1933 (which ap-
proximately doubled its market share to 80%) was held to be a legitimate means of busi-
ness expansion and not an element of a calculated quest for monopoly control. Second,
operation of the evening newspaper at a financial loss was not proved because costs and
revenue allocations between the defendant's newspapers were deemed bookkeeping transac-
tions without relevant economic or legal significance. Third, the defendant's interference
with news vendors and other distributors was held to be merely part of an effort to seek
equal treatment by vendors and not an interference with the competitor's business. Id. at
627.
57 Times-Picayune Publ. Co. v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 670, 677-81 (E.D. La. 1952).
68 Id. at 678.
69 345 U.S. at 627.
60 Id. In examining the reasonableness of the unit rates under § 1, the Court adopted
a purpose-effect approach, holding that the institution of unit rates was predominantly
motivated by legitimate business purposes and that there were no anticompetitive effects
resulting from the system. Id. at 621-24. Four factors were relied upon in establishing the
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Court noted that conduct which is defensive in character and consistent
with industry-wide practices tended to be based on a legitimate pur-
pose even though standing alone it might have been illegal.61 The
Court thus took a relatively permissive view of the competitive struggle,
at least with respect to what constitutes unreasonable restraints and
attempts to monopolize. The criteria used by the Court demonstrate
an objective rather than a subjective approach to specific intent, with
conduct viewed primarily in light of competitors' activities and indus-
try-wide practices. 62 The standard is objective in that the inquiry is an
evaluation of the legitimacy of a defendant's conduct from the perspec-
tive of industry practices and structural conditions rather than from a
determination of a defendant's state of mind.
The Court in Times-Picayune distinguished both Lorain and
Griffith. The conduct in Lorain characterized as "bold, relentless, and
predatory commercial behavior, 6 3 was said to be not "remotely com-
parable" to the conduct in Times-Picayune.6 4 Distinguishing the Grif-
fith-type two-market cases proved more troublesome. First, the Court,
citing Griffith and Swift, stated that a two-market situation can indeed
give rise to an attempt violation. 5 Although the citation to Swift might
legitimate purpose under § 1 (and impliedly under § 2): (1) defensive adoption of unit
rates to match a competitor's practice was particularly relevant when intent was ambigu-
ous; (2) unit rates substantially reduced costs and rationalized complicated and multiple
printing operations; (3) unit rates were not a novel restrictive scheme but an industry-wide
practice; and (4) unit rates were considered by the newspaper industry as a competitive
weapon against other media for national advertising accounts. Id. at 623-24.
61 Id. at 624-25.
62 The second factor mentioned by the Court in its approach to the § 1 claim-
reduction of costs and rationalization of production-might appear to represent a sub-
jective approach since it is used to disprove the contention that the subjective purpose of
the conduct was to destroy a competitor or to build a monopoly. But the defendants could
still have subjectively desired to attain monopoly power with production rationalization
employed as a means toward that goal. The Court, however, made a judgment that cost
reductions and rationalization were economically desirable and, therefore, legitimate.
Similarly, conduct which promotes competition in a larger market was generally considered
desirable and legitimate.
The Supreme Court on a number of occasions has refused to approve conduct which
had demonstrable anticompetitive effects in one market, even though it was contended
that the same conduct helped the defendant compete in a second market. See, e.g., United
States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 821 (1965). Times-Picayune is not inconsistent
with such decisions, because the Court there dealt only with "purpose" in a situation in
which no anticompetitive effects were in fact found.
63 242 U.S. at 149.
64 345 U.S. at 627.
65 The Court distinguished familiar attempt cases from the more peculiar Griffith
two-market situation: "This case does not demonstrate an attempt by a monopolist
established in one area to nose into a second market, so that past monopolistic success both
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be best viewed as a genuflection to Justice Holmes, the citation to
Griffith, subsequently repeated in Otter Tail,66 is significant, for the
Court reads Griffith's two-market conduct as an attempt offense rathei
than a "misuse of monopoly power" offense under a different provision
of section 2. A neater and less troublesome handling of the Griffith
offense is to consider it a separate section 2 offense, focusing on the
defendant's alleged use of leverage. Furthermore, the Court's two rea-
sons for making the Griffith two-market situation an attempt offense are
not convincing. It is questionable whether "past monopolistic suc-
cess"67 enhances the probability of future harmful conduct in a second
market or "supplies a motivation for further forays." 6 While these con-
tentions may not be wholly inaccurate, they are speculative, require
more empirical proof, and are ill-concealed attempts to stretch the
misuse of monopoly power situation to fit within the traditional at-
tempt formula.
It is clear from these cases that the Supreme Court treats specific
intent in terms of an evaluation of conduct. The Court in Columbia
Steel and Times-Picayune adopted a legitimate business purpose test
to negate specific intent. That the conduct be only predominantly
motivated by a legitimate business purpose may be a Times-Picayune
refinement. However, it is doubtful that this refinement is workable,
for the assignment of weights and degrees to "purpose" is meaningless
as long as specific intent is viewed in terms of business behavior.
Unfortunately, it is not clear which criteria are relevant to the
conduct evaluation. The decisions have considered assorted economic
justifications. 69 More significantly, the criteria have included consistency
with a competitor's conduct, consistency with trade practices in the
industry, and use of defensive tactics. These factors reveal a rather
permissive stance toward alleged attempts, because practices which
meet these criteria may lack any economic justification. Thus, the
Supreme Court has been willing to tolerate a rougher and more free-
wheeling competitive struggle than many lower courts, particularly
those which have adopted a fairness standard.70 This attitude is best
enhances the probability of future harm and supplies a motivation for further forays."
Id. at 626 (citations omitted).
66 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 1022, 1029 (1973).
67 345 U.S. at 626.
68 Id.
69 E.g., cost reductions and production rationalization in Times-Picayune and vertical
integration following geographic expansion in Columbia Steel.
70 See Judge Wyzanski's opinion in Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New
England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1959), modified, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 865 U.S. 833 (1961).
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exemplified by the Court's refusal in Times-Picayune to find an at-
tempt, despite the district court's finding that unit rates were im-
plemented for the purpose of destroying a competitor. 71
There are, unfortunately, too few Supreme Court decisions to
conclude which particular business reasons or economic justifications
are acceptable as negations of specific intent, or, more accurately, as
factors which are likely to result in a favorable evaluation of conduct.
II
APPROACHES OF LOWER COURTS TO
MONOPOLIZATION AttEMPTS
An almost anarchic state exists in the lower courts with respect to
the definition and rationale of the attempt to monopolize offense. The
Swift formulation is the most frequently verbalized, yet it is found in
less than half of the opinions.7 2 Although specific intent appears to be
required by all courts, dangerous probability is ignored in over half
the opinions.73 No formulation, standard, or even general approach
is stated or implied in nearly twenty percent of the cases, 74 indicating
that many courts treat attempt claims as addenda to claims under
section 1 of the Sherman Act or section 3 of the Clayton Act.75
71 345 U.S. at 601.
72 See, e.g., Central Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 422 F.2d 504
(8th Cir. 1970); Diamond Int'l Corp. v. Walterhoefer, 289 F. Supp. 550 (D. Md. 1968).
73 Only the Ninth Circuit has expressly rejected dangerous probability as a
requirement. See, e.g., Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). However, it has recently indicated second thoughts about its
position. See Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1972). Decisions in other
circuits may fail to mention dangerous probability because a finding of no specific intent
renders the former immaterial. See, e.g., Southern Blowpipe & Roofing Co. v. Chattanooga
Gas Co., 360 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1966); Bowl America, Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F. Supp.
1080 (D. Md. 1969); Mount Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453
(W.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969).
74 E.g., Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970); Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383
(6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); B & B Oil & Chem. Corp. v. Franklin Oil
Corp., 293 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Mich. 1968); Otto Milk Co. v. United Dairy Farmers Coop.
Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Pa. 1966), aff'd, 388 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1967).
75 Different or more complex formulations are expressed in a small number of
opinions. Some offer a second definition as an alternative to Swift. For example, the
Griffith misuse of monopoly power rationale was employed in two decisions. See McElhen-
ney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959); GAF Corp. v. Circle
Floor Co., 329 F. Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Another alternative definition expressed was
"completion of [conduct] charged would ... make [the defendant] a monopoly." Campbell
Distrib. Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 208 F. Supp. 523, 528 (D. Md. 1962).




While all lower courts accept specific intent as an essential element
of the attempt offense, its definition and treatment vary considerably,
and no majority definition or approach can be gleaned from the deci-
sions.7 6 Some decisions contain no analysis of specific intent whatso-
ever.77 Other opinions recite a factual description of the conduct in-
volved followed simply by a finding, accompanied by little or no analy-
sis, that specific intent can or cannot be inferred from such conduct.7 8
In cases involving allegations of both attempt and monopolization,
courts often fail to distinguish between the general intent element of
actual monopolization and the specific intent requirement of attempt
daims.7 9
A few courts, however, have addressed themselves to specific intent
Swift formulation: (1) "significant . . . market power [plus] . . . conduct likely to achieve
... a monopoly in a line of commerce" or "certain commercially unfair acts [done] with
the specific intent of destroying or injuring plaintiff and eliminating competition" (Sam
S. Goldstein Indus. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 728, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)); (2) " a
plan to reach out beyond [the instant] acquisition by additional mergers" or an intent" to
use the acquisition itself to monopolize even though it did not in fact achieve its goal"
(Bender v. Hearst Corp., 152 F. Supp. 569, 578 (D. Conn. 1957)); and (3) attempt to exclude
a competitor from the opportunity of doing business. See United States v. Klearfiax Linen
Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945). None of these formulations materially differs
from the more usual elements, although Goldstein can be interpreted as requiring specific
intent or dangerous probability.
76 Most of the courts addressing themselves to specific intent define it as intent to
acquire monopoly power (see, e.g., Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964); Clausen & Sons v. Theodore Haem Brewing Co., 284
F. Supp. 148 (D. Minn. 1967), rev'd, 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1968); American Football
League v. National Football League, 205 F. Supp. 60 (D. Md. 1962), aff'd, 323 F,2d 124 (4th
Cir. 1963)); intent to monopolize (see, e.g., Mount Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp.,
283 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969); Bergjans
Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Mo. 1965), aff'd, 368
F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966)); intent to exclude a particular competitor (see, e.g., United States
v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945)); or intent to destroy a
particular competitor. See, e.g., American Football League v. National Football League,
supra; Scott Publ. Co. v. Columbia Basin Publ., Inc., 180 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Wash. 1959),
aff'd, 293 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1961). These various definitions have been used interchangeably
and without affecting judicial approaches to specific intent or to attempts to monopolize in
general.
77 See, e.g., Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970); South End Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 650 (N).
Ill. 1965); cf. Mackey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 237 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied per
stipulation, 355 U.S. 865 (1957).
78 See, e.g., Evening News Publ. Co. v. Allied Newspaper Carriers, 160 F. Supp. 568
(D.N.J. 1958), aff'd, 263 F.2d 715 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 929 (1959).
79 See, e.g., Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1966),
rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 384 (1967); Bowl America, Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299
F. Supp. 1080 (D. Md. 1969).
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in greater detail. These opinions reveal varying approaches to specific
intent: (1) the legitimate business purpose approach, 0 (2) the unfairness
approach,"' and (3) the gestalt approach.82 Each approach involves the
familiar evaluation of conduct. The variable is the extent to which this
evaluation remains free of subjective intent, or conversely, the extent to
which this evaluation can be limited to purely behavioral criteria.
Despite the Supreme Court's almost exclusive reliance on behavioral
criteria, the criteria employed by the lower courts are, unfortunately,
not nearly so dear.
1. Legitimate Business Purpose Approach
The majority of courts which discuss specific intent speak in terms
of conduct not having a legitimate business purpose. This formulation
is consistent with the language in Times-Picayune.3 The approach
reveals, however, an inherent ambivalence. The word "purpose" con-
notes subjective intent-an intent to monopolize existing in the defen-
dant's mind-while the term "legitimate" emphasizes objective factors
-intent inferred from overt acts.
It can be safely concluded that a subjective intent to monopolize
without some overt conduct does not constitute an unlawful attempt.8M
In the usual attempt case, overt conduct exists as a matter of record
and the issue is the relevance and weight to be accorded a finding of
subjective intent. Of course, direct evidence of subjective intent to
monopolize or to eliminate a competitor is rarely present in the cases.85
When such evidence does exist, the courts accord it little or no weight
in their stated rationales; 86 rather, they hold that specific intent can
80 See notes 83-109 and accompanying text infra.
81 See notes 110-30 and accompanying text infra.
82 See notes 131-33 and accompanying text infra.
83 345 U.S. at 627.
84 See, e.g., Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 961 (1969).
85 Few decisions refer to direct evidence of an unlawful subjective intent. See, e.g.,
Scott Publ. Co. v. Columbia Basin Publ., Inc., 293 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v.
Singer Mfg. Co., 205 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 374 U.S. 174
(1963). In only two of these cases was a violation found. See Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 326
F. Supp. 627 (W.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32
(D. Minn. 1945).
80 Perhaps the most colorful example is found in Scott Publ. Co. v. Columbia Basin
Publ. Inc., 293 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1961), in which the defendant, owner and chief executive
officer of one of two newspapers involved in a bitter competitive struggle in a small town,
stated that he would buy out the plaintiff for five cents on the dollar and that he was
driving the plaintiff "to the wall." Id. at 21. The court held that this was not evidence of
specific intent because the defendant actually believed he would become the dominant
paper by reason of his superior experience and because the second statement was only part
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be inferred from conduct. Thus, evidence of business reasons for
certain practices is admissible as indicative of purpose or motive.8 7
This inference contains within it, however, an evaluation by the court
of the legitimacy of those practices. The interplay between legitimacy
and purpose leads to an almost Byzantine intricacy which is illustrated
in the following decisions.
Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.88 is an
example of a decision which excluded subjective intent from its analy-
sis, although it properly considered the business reasons for the conduct
in question. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had the burden
of proving that the defendant's acts were "not 'predominantly motivated
by legitimate business aims,' but instead were done in order to gain
monopoly power."8' 9 The defendant was a vertically-integrated steel
producer-fabricator who had "rationed" steel supplies to fabricators,
including the plaintiff, on a nondiscriminatory basis. The court found
that a sudden and unexpected steel shortage in 1955, a time of sud-
denly increased demand due to a housing boom, legitimized the defen-
dant's business purpose even though the conduct gave the appearance
of a supply squeeze by an integrated producer.90
A more subjective ingredient was injected into the analysis in
Southern Blowpipe & Roofing Co. v. Chattanooga Gas Co.91 There,
the defendant, a gas utility with a total monopoly in the gas market,
had allegedly sold gas appliances at or below cost. The court rejected
an attempt claim, finding that the defendant's purpose was not to
monopolize the gas appliance market but to multiply the uses of its
gas and increase its sales in the primary gas market.92 This lawful
of a sales pitch to a union which was helping to finance the defendant. Id. at 21-22. A
more recent example is Dahl, Inc. v. Roy Cooper Co., 448 F.2d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1971), in
which the court stated:
Dahl's attempt-to-monopolize daim rests entirely on its allegation that an
employee of Cooper told an employee of Dahl that Cooper would drive Dahl out
of business if Dahl chose to compete. Such a manifestation of intent to triumph
in the competitive market, in the absence of evidence of unfair, anticompetitive or
predatory conduct, is not enough to establish a violation of § 2.
87 See, e.g., Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656
(9th Cir. 1963).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 667, quoting Times-Picayune Publ. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626-27
(1953).
90 322 F.2d at 667-68. The circuit court strictly applied this approach by affirming a
directed verdict for the defendants. At the same time the court did not view the business
purpose approach as the exclusive standard. It noted that the plaintiff made "no complaint
that [defendant's] success was due to grossly unfair pricing or a resort to unfair business
practices." Id. at 668 (emphasis added).
91 860 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 844 (1968).
92 Id. at 80.
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purpose was supported by evidence indicating that the defendant had
encouraged others to sell gas appliances and had offered free servicing
of all appliances, including those purchased from competing appliance
manufacturers. 93
A certain ambiguity inheres in the courts' concept of purpose.
In one sense purpose is used to denote a subjective state of mind. How-
ever, this state of mind is inferred from conduct and the suspicion
arises that intent is a fiction found to exist only after evaluation of the
conduct on other grounds. Southern Blowpipe illustrates how subjective
intent distorts the primary focus of the inquiry. In a two-market case
such as Southern Blowpipe, the defendant's asserted leverage power,
which is said to give rise to anticompetitive effects, is the primary and
overriding issue and should not be obfuscated by considerations of the
defendant's subjective intention to acquire monopoly power in the
subsidiary market.
Many opinions indicate that judgments are made on the basis of
imprecise notions of what practices and conduct should be prohibited.
Specific intent and legitimate business purpose provide convenient
vehicles to disguise this imprecision even though a detailed examina-
tion of each aspect of the conduct may be set forth by the court.
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.94 illustrates the complexity
and occasional inconsistency in the application of the legitimate busi-
ness purpose test. The court vacillated between a purely subjective
approach and a legitimate business purpose approach in examining
several of the defendants' practices and acts.9 5
First, tying arrangements made during the initial stage of the
defendants' business were held not to constitute an unlawful attempt
for the same reason that the arrangements were held not to constitute
unreasonable restraints of trade-namely, that the tying contracts were
necessary to enable the defendants to do business in a new and uncer-
tain industry involving substantial investment risks.9 The court also
93 Id.
94 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 US. 567 (1961).
95 In Jerrold, the government alleged tying arrangements (unlawful under § I of the
Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act), vertical acquisitions (unlawful under § 7 of the
Clayton Act), conspiracy to monopolize, and attempt to monopolize. The defendants were
a CATV manufacturer in the decade following World War II, a period when cable
television was then a new industry involving a high investment risk. By mid-1954, the
defendants had gained 75% of the CATV market and were earning a substantial return on
their investment. 187 F. Supp. at 555. The court, in a nonjury trial, found an unlawful at-
tempt only in the narrow conduct area of certain threats made by one of the defendants'
salesmen. Id. at 568-69.
96 Id. at 567.
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appears, however, to have adopted a more subjective intent approach.
Noting that the defendants were initially faced by such "formidable
competitors" as RCA and Philco, the court concluded that not even
the most ambitious businessman would enter such a market with a
policy or intent to drive out competitors.97 This subjective approach
is more pronounced in the court's examination of tie-ins continuing
after the defendants were established. The court found that although
these tie-ins were no longer justified and were therefore unreasonable
restraints of trade, this did not render the tie-ins unlawful attempts to
monopolize since the section 1 violations did not mean "that the de-
fendants were not acting in good faith in maintaining [the tie-ins] as
long as they did."198 Good faith is a conclusory term which does not
adequately articulate the court's rationale for holding that the tie-ins
did not constitute an attempt at a time when they were no longer
economically justified.
The second practice examined by the court was a discriminatory
licensing scheme which never became operational. In connection with
that scheme, the defendant corporation's president threatened a cus-
tomer with patent litigation if purchases were made from a competitor.
The court characterized the threat as "improper" and "ill-considered,"
but refused to infer specific intent to monopolize. 9 Since there was no
legitimate business purpose or economic justification for the threats,
a subjective approach appears to have dictated the result.100 The court
reasoned that the president had made the threat because he was
"piqued" at the customer and felt that he had been discourteously
treated and had been given insufficient consideration for his products.
This pique did not excuse the threat "but [did] explain away any
inference of monopolistic intent." 01
Third, specific intent was inferred from the conduct of the sales-
men of one of the defendants who had threatened to install competing
cable television systems if the operator refused to buy the defendants'
equipment. The court held that this threat constituted "most improper
conduct," the natural effect of which "would be to create a monopoly
[for the defendants] in the Northwest." 10 2 This approach is certainly
not purely subjective; the threat would probably constitute specific
97 Id. at 567-68.
98 Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
99 Id. at 570.
100 See id. at 570-71.
101 Id. However, the court further noted that this was only one and not a series of
threats (id.), detracting somewhat from the purely subjective approach previously taken.
102 Id. at 69.
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intent under a legitimate business purpose approach although such
an approach was not mentioned. Nevertheless, no alternative approach
can be gleaned beyond the court's characterization of the conduct as
"most improper," a standard which smacks of the unfairness ap-
proach.103
The court in Jerrold adopted inconsistent approaches despite its
citation of the legitimate business purpose standard. A subjective intent
test was utilized in the claims of the later tie-ins and the threats of
patent litigation. This subjective standard was applied to exonerate
conduct which had neither economic justification nor was motivated by
business reasons. The acquisitions and the salesmen's threats were dis-
cussed in terms of impropriety and unfairness. A subjective standard
was not verbalized. Thus, the court's decision may rest on notions and
criteria not articulated in the opinion.
The mushrooming of professional football in the early 1960's
gave rise to a second example of the disparate applications of the legiti-
mate business purpose test. In American Football League v. National
Football League,1°  unethical business conduct was rejected as the ap-
propriate standard; the court apparently viewed specific intent in terms
of a subjective state of mind.0 5 Closer examination, however, reveals
the ingredients of the legitimate business purpose test. For example,
the district court accepted as negating specific intent evidence that the
NFL owners felt expansion was financially profitable and necessary to
help the NFL compete effectively with the AFL.10 6 But the court also
relied on additional evidence which did not indicate asserted business
purposes for the expansion.107 In other words, some of the evidence used
103 The defendants also made vertical acquisitions resulting in an increase of their
market share from 1.5% to 10%. The Court held that it would not be "fair" to infer
specific intent from this activity absent any proof of a sustained practice of arbitrary
supply squeezes. Although the result is consistent with other challenges of vertical acquisi-
tions as attempts to monopolize (see notes 173-219 and accompanying text infra), the
articulation of the rationale is somewhat imprecise.
104 205 F. Supp. 60 (D. Md. 1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963). The AFL
claimed that the NFL's announced expansion into Dallas, Houston, and Minnesota was
intended to exclude the newer AFL from those natural monopoly markets and that the
announcements constituted a restraint of trade, actual monopolization, conspiracy to
monopolize, and a concerted attempt to monopolize. 205 F. Supp. at 63. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed a verdict for the defendants reached following a nonjury trial.
105 The district court indicated that an unlawful subjective intent to destroy the
AFL must be the predominant motive behind the expansion. 205 F. Supp. at 65. The
court of appeals stated that a specific, subjective intent to gain an illegal degree of market
control must be present. 323 F.2d at 132 n.18. The district court left open the question of
the result when legal and illegal motives each had equal weight. 205 F. Supp. at 65 n.6.
100 205 F. Supp. at 78.
107 The court considered evidence that offers and suggestions made by the NFL
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to negate specific intent consisted of the business reasons for the expan-
sion, while other conduct was analyzed in terms of motives rather than
economic justifications"8
As these cases illustrate, inclusion of a subjective intent standard
permits the introduction of a greater variety of evidence than is relevant
to the legitimate business purposes of a defendant. The most important
new category consists of evidence which, although not strictly relating
to the business reasons underlying the questionable practices, never-
theless indicates a defendant's motive to monopolize or to destroy a
competitor.109 The additional evidence is typically used to negate
specific intent, thereby permitting conduct which lacks legitimate busi-
ness justification.
2. Unfairness Approach
A few courts have characterized specific intent in valuative terms
such as "unfair," "predatory," and "not honestly industrial." 10 These
terms imply the existence of a code of ethical conduct among com-
petitors by which specific practices are evaluated to determine which
conduct should be prohibited as an attempt to monopolize. Traces of
this approach are visible in Times-Picayune where the Court dis-
tinguished Lorain on the ground that Lorain involved "bold, relentless
and predatory" behavior."'
Again, one receives the uncomfortable impression that terms such
as "unfair" may not be the result of a coherent code of business ethics,
but merely a verbal screen to mask the court's condemnation." 2 Only
owners were part of an. effort by both leagues to find solutions to their mutual problems.
Id. at 78-79.
108 The circuit court, in holding that subjective specific intent was not established,
relied on two kinds of evidence: (1) evidence that the NFL owners were already com-
mitted, to expansion before the AFL was conceived and that they therefore had no intent
to destroy the AFL; and (2) other evidence of "substantial business and economic reasons"
for the expansion. 323 F.2d at 132.
109 For example, the district court in American Football League refused to believe
an unequivocal statement by one of the NFL owners that the purpose of the expansion was
to destroy the AFL. See 205 F. Supp. at 78-79.
110 Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125, 140,
144 (D. Mass. 1959), modified, 284 F.2d 582 (Ist Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961);
see Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1342 (9th Cir.
1970) ("unfair tactics'); Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968, 975 (8th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969) ('unfair and predatory trade practices"); Sam S.
Goldstein Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 728, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) ("com-
mercially unfair acts").
111 Times-Picayune Publ. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 627 (1953).
112 For example, in Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d
1336 (9th Cir. 1970), the defendant, a full-line integrated manufacturer, terminated the
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one lower court decision, Judge Wyzanski's opinion in Union Leader
Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc.," 3 has articulated the un-
fairness approach in a thoughtful fashion. Judge Wyzanski initially
distinguished specific intent, defined as "intent to exclude competition,"
from the use of unfair means to implement that intent.11 4 He held,
however, that the same conduct constituted evidence of both unfair
means and specific intent:
[T]here is no sharp distinction between (a) the existence of an
intent to exclude and (b) the use of unfair means. In a situation
where it is inevitable that only one competitor can survive [natural
monopoly], the evidence which shows the use, or contemplated
use, of unfair means is the very same evidence which shows the
existence of an exclusionary intent."n
Thus, the court attempted to avoid reliance on a subjective intent
standard, and even implied that direct evidence of a subjective intent
to destroy a competitor is irrelevant."" To avoid the vagaries of sub-
jective intent and legitimate business purpose, the court formulated
plaintiff's distributorship and began direct retail sales to former customers of the plain-
tiff. This entry into the plaintiff's market was allegedly followed by charging these cus-
tomers lower prices and by the hiring of the plaintiff's top salesman who took additional
customers with him to the defendant. The circuit court characterized the conduct as "un-
fair tactics" which constituted specific intent, but did not discuss the criteria and policy
considerations underlying the determination or offer any explanation of the content of the
ethical code. Id. at 1342.
113 180 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1959), modified, 284 F.2d 582 (Ist Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 833 (1961). The defendant published the Gazette, the only newspaper in Haver-
hill, Massachusetts. Following a labor dispute in 1957, its circulation dropped approxi-
mately 50%. Some Haverhill merchants then induced a New Hampshire publisher to
begin a newspaper in Haverhill, the Journal. An intense rivalry ensued in what the
court found to be a natural monopoly situation. Eventually, the Gazette sold out to a
group of New England publishers after it refused an offer to buy from the Journal.
Shortly after this sale, the publisher of the Journal brought an action for treble damages
and injunctive relief alleging violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act, attempt to monopolize,
and actual monopolization. The publisher of the Gazette counterclaimed for identical
relief and on the same grounds. After a nonjury trial, the district court found both sides
had violated § 1 and § 2. 180 F. Supp. at 145-47. The circuit court modified the decree,
holding that only the plaintiff had attempted to monopolize and that the defendant
Gazette's conduct was not unlawful. 284 F.2d at 589-90.
114 Judge Wyzanski described § 2 as prohibiting "a person... who has an intent to
exclude competition . . . from using not merely technical restraints of trade, but even
predatory practices ... what may loosely be called unfair means." 180 F. Supp. at 140.
115 Id.
116 The court cited the Restatement of Torts, which states that a person is not subject
to liability even though one of his intentions is the causing of harm to a competitor's busi-
ness. RTrATEMENT OF TORTS § 709, comment c (Tent. Draft no. 17, 1938). As Judge
Wyzanski aptly put it: "The law allows other joys in business life beside making money."
180 F. Supp. at 144.
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what it hoped was a more objective standard"--violations of section
1 of the Sherman Act constitute evidence of specific intent. Only when
this section 1 test fails to dispose adequately of the issue is the general
unfairness approach employed as a supplement. Thus, per se violations
of section 1 are conclusive evidence of intent." 8 Unreasonable restraints
of trade constitute rebuttable evidence of specific intent. Conduct
found to be neither per se unlawful nor unreasonable under section 1
constitutes evidence of specific intent if such conduct can be character-
ized as "unfair."
The court in Union Leader applied the unfairness rationale to
varying types of practices and conduct. This application discloses that
the approach has its own inconsistencies and ambiguities. An arrange-
ment whereby the plaintiff paid large advertisers to solicit advertising
without disclosing to solicitees that they were paid employees of the
plaintiff was expressly condemned by the court. The arrangement was
described as a "secret commission to an allegedly disinterested person
for boosting the sale of a product." 119 Judge Wyzanski found the prac-
tice to be "misleading and immoral" and held it to be an "unfair prac-
tice" and "not honestly industrial."' 20 The emphasis here was obviously
on an ethical code of conduct rather than on business justifications or
economic criteria. A court with a more permissive attitude towards com-
petition might view this arrangement more tolerantly.121
The judge's emphasis, however, shifted towards economic con-
117 This attempted simplification and clarification is consistent with Judge Wyzan-
ski's general approach toward the actual monopolization provision. See, e.g., United States
v. Grinnel Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 247-48 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd in part, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
Judge Wyzanski also appears to have been influenced in Union Leader by his earlier
approach to actual monopolization in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 847 U.S. 521 (1954), in which he emphasized
criteria such as predatory practices, unfair methods of competition, and business patterns
not "honestly industrial." 110 F. Supp. at 841, 542. Indeed, he cites Alcoa and United Shoe
in Union Leader and does not appear to make any significant distinction between his
specific intent standard for attempts and the standard for actual monopolization. This
apparent identity of standards may be explained by the fact that a natural monopoly
situation existed, since the successful competitor will eventually acquire monopoly power
and the actual monopolization standard would then apply.
118 For example, Judge Wyzanski found a concerted boycott when the plaintiff and
the union representing the defendant's employees requested merchants to advertise solely
in the plaintiff's newspaper. 180 F. Supp. at 140.
119 Id. at 141.
120 Id.
121 In Scott Publ. Co. v. Columbia Basin Publ., Inc., 293 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1961), the
court refused to find an attempt to monopolize in a competitive struggle between two
small-town newspapers. While the particular acts and practices differ from those in Union
Leader, the case is instructive because the tone of the opinion differs from the moralizing
temper of Union Leader. Indeed, the circuit court in Scott dismissed Union Leader as
precedent almost as an afterthought in a footnote. Id. at 22 n.17.
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siderations when the plaintiff's secret discriminatory advertising rates
were examined. Prima facie evidence of specific intent was said to arise
when the defendant has substantial market power and no business
justification exists, such as quantity discounts. Similarly, the plaintiff's
attempt to buy out the defendant was not considered evidence of
specific intent on the ground that the market was a natural monopoly
and the purchase of a competitor at a reasonable price merely hastened
the inevitable demise of continued competition.122 Finally, the unfair-
ness approach was not relied on at all in examining the defendant's
joint venture with the other New England publishers.123
In sum, specific intent was initially discussed in terms of unfair-
ness, but each particular practice was analyzed in a variety of ways.
This demonstrates that some competitive conduct cannot be evaluated
solely on the basis of unfairness and that economic factors must be
openly and directly considered.
On appeal, the First Circuit generally adhered to this unfairness
rationale with one important modification. The circuit court stated
that an inference of wrongful intent could be rebutted by showing
that the conduct was a defensive tactic necessary to avoid insolvency
in the equity sense: 24
In calling this an "unfair practice" the [district] court assumed
the point. For ... the practice was "unfair" if conducted with an
intent to monopolize, but it was fair if it was intended only to re-
sist deterioration of its own position brought about by [the plain-
tiff's] unlawful activities. 25
Although the circuit court theoretically rejected Judge Wyzanski's
apparent equation of unfairness with intent, its own intent test is no
more substantive or objective than Judge Wyzanski's unfairness cri-
terion. Nevertheless, the circuit court did hold that a party's conduct
in response to a competitor's unlawful activity was an important factor
in determining specific intent. This reasoning is arguably compelled
by the statement in Times-Picayune that a competitor's unlawful prac-
tices are relevant factors in illuminating a defendant's "ambiguous" in-
tent. 20 Since a defendant's intent is invariably, and perhaps inherently,
ambiguous, such evidence is always relevant.
The conflict between the district and the circuit court is best
122 180 F. Supp. at 142. This reasoning is criticized in Marcus, Monopoly Profits,
Economic Impossibility, and Unfairness as Anti-Trust Tests, 14 VAMo. L. REV. 581, 587-88
(1961).
123 180 F. Supp. at 143-45.
124 284 F.2d at 586-87.
125 Id. at 586.
126 345 US. at 627.
1145
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
described as a difference in attitude toward the competitive struggle.
Judge Wyzanski envisioned the struggle governed by an undisclosed
ethical code of business behavior which is based on moral as well as
economic criteria. Judge Aldrich of the First Circuit adopted a more
permissive attitude in which the combatants in the struggle have fewer
restrictions on their conduct.
It should be noted that the unfairness approach could result in
application of the attempt prohibition to conduct which also violates
state statutory and common law rights, such as disparagement and
tortious interference with contract.127 Most courts have not adopted
the unfairness approach, perhaps out of a fear that such an ethical
standard would result in an unwarranted extension of the federal anti-
trust laws.' 28 Indeed, a few courts have expressly rejected the assertion
that section 2 of the Sherman Act embodies an ethical business conduct
code, arguing that specific intent is "neither rough competition nor
unethical business conduct"' 29 and that state tort laws, not federal
antitrust laws, must be relied upon to enforce business morality. 80
3. Gestalt Approach
Under the gestalt approach, the practices from which specific intent
is to be inferred are admitted into evidence and are submitted to the
jury under very broad instructions defining specific intent as intent to
acquire monopoly power or to destroy a competitor. The jury may
1327 The ethical approach is not necessarily more restrictive. Certainly a permissive
business ethic could be posited. However, the courts which have approached the attempt
problem in ethical terms seem more willing to condemn restrictive business conduct as an
attempt to monopolize.
128 In cases based upon state tort or contract law, a common response to attempt
allegations is to treat them as superfluous. One excellent example is M.E. Fletcher Co.
v. Rock of Ages Corp., 326 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1963), which involved a quarry-owner-fabrica-
tor's refusal to sell to a competing fabricator. Monopolization and attempt to monopolize
were alleged. In reversing a preliminary injunction against the defendant, the circuit court
stated: "Despite the conventional antitrust trappings with which the case has been draped,
what we have here . . .is essentially a private squabble between two sets of energetic
Yankee businessmen." Id. at 17.
129 American Football League v. National Football League, 205 F. Supp. 60, 65 (D.
Md. 1962). See also Bowl America, Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 1080, (D. Md.
1969). In Windsor Theatre Co. v. Walbrook Amusement Co., 94 F. Supp. 388, 396 (D. Md.
1950), the court stated: "Plaintiff's contention that [defendant's] aggressive competitive
activities constituted monopoly or an attempt to monopolize ... appears to be an effort
to unduly magnify small and possibly unethical business competitive practices into a
[Sherman Act] offense."
13o See B & B Oil & Chem. Co. v. Franklin Oil Corp., 293 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Mich.
1968). "Fair dealing" has also been criticized as a general antitrust policy on the ground
that it is unenforceable. See C. KAYSEN & D. TuRNER, ANTrrRusr POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND
LFGAL ANALYSIS 56-58 (1959).
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infer the requisite intent from all the practices viewed as a whole,
without any discussion or examination of each individual practice
or activity. 31 This reliance on the jury is particularly dangerous in
cases in which the charge on the attempt offense is buried among the
instructions on actual monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize. 13 2
The danger is aggravated when special interrogatories to the jury are
not employed.
The principal defect of the gestalt approach is its frequent failure
to provide adequate direction to the jury.13 3 Not only is the finding
of specific intent crucial to the decision, but it also obscures judgments
which involve major policy considerations in critical and uncertain
areas of antitrust law. The fact finder is not making a finding simply
of the defendant's state of mind as in the ordinary criminal attempt
situation, but is evaluating various business transactions. This evalua-
tion is far too complicated and significant to be made by a jury with
insufficient guidance, particularly when liberal admission rules permit
a voluminous and often contradictory record.
Another drawback of the gestalt approach is its inadequacy as a
tool for evaluating particular practices or aspects of a defendant's
conduct. Certain practices may be desirable, some may be neutral, and
others may be dearly unlawful under other sections of the antitrust
131 In Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd on
other grounds, 389 U.S. 384 (1967), the jury was instructed to examine the "whole pic-
ture," which consisted of the following practices of a fully-integrated orange grower-re-
tailer: refusal to sell to the plaintiff-processor, prevention of other producers from selling
to the plaintiff, price and supply squeezes, restrictive selling agreements, and misuse of con-
signment contracts and low bidding. See 369 F.2d at 459. See also Kansas City Star Co. v.
United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1957).
In a recent case, a district court instructed the jury in the following terms:
And I am leaving this all for you to consider as part of the whole picture because
the Supreme Court has many times said that when you are faced with restraints
of trade and attempts to monopolize trade, you can't necessarily break them down
into separate compartments. You have got to view the picture as a whole. And so
you consider all these matters and all the evidence in this case to determine
whether in your own mind there was any violation of an attempt to violate the
antitrust laws in the case.
Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 5 TADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 1 74,015, at 92,220 (W.D. Pa.
1972).
132 See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 371 US. 801 (1962) (jury instructions which combined monopolization, conspiracy
to monopolize, and attempt to monopolize approved).
133 A finding of specific intent, either by jury or judge, should not be subject to the
"dearly erroneous" rule limiting appellate review of findings of fact because the finding
is both an ultimate finding of fact and an ultimate legal issue. Thus, the Tenth Circuit
has strongly condemned sending ultimate legal issues to the jury in antitrust cases. See




laws. Distinctions among these types of practices may be helpful in
classifying as unlawful a defendant's conduct as a whole. Thus, the
gestalt approach makes it extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible,
to predict the outcome of particular attempt claims or to advise clients
concerning contemplated practices and conduct.
The gestalt approach is not necessarily limited to the jury. Cases
in which the judge renders a finding of specific intent without any
discussion or analysis are examples of a gestalt approach taken by the
judiciary. This often occurs when the attempt allegations are treated
as tag-along claims for relief. The judge, however, may be employing
a different approach without defining it in his opinion. Speculation
as to the reasons for an inarticulated rationale is hazardous. But
certainly the absence of well-defined standards governing specific intent
or attempts in general must provide strong motivation for an already
overburdened judge to adopt a gestalt approach, particularly when
counsel treat the attempt claim as a secondary issue.
The gestalt approach is acceptable as a means of evaluating acts
and practices as a whole rather than each in isolation. It does not
follow, however, that the jury should be instructed in terms of "specific
intent" or a "common plan or scheme." These terms connote a state
of mind which is irrelevant to the attempt to monopolize offense. Thus,
to the extent that the underlying rationale of the gestalt approach-
evaluation of conduct as a whole-can be applied without reference
to specific intent or a common plan or scheme, it is valid and should
be analyzed separately from specific intent doctrines.
4. Conclusion
The lower courts have sometimes adopted inconsistent approaches
to specific intent, even when they have articulated the requirement in
terms of legitimate business purpose. The major differences between
the Supreme Court and lower court approaches has been the latter's oc-
casional inclusion of a concept of subjective intent to monopolize or
to destroy a competitor. This inclusion has had two undesirable re-
sults: (1) lack of a subjective intent has been used by some courts to
allow conduct lacking apparent economic justification or business
reasons, and (2) evidence has been admitted relevant to a finding of
subjective intent which does not consist strictly of economic justifica-
tions or business reasons for the conduct and practices in question.
To this extent, lower court determinations of specific intent have not
been an evaluation of conduct limited entirely to behavioral, as con-
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trasted with intentional, criteria. This is unfortunate because subjective
intent to monopolize is not only irrelevant in this evaluation, but it
also tends to obfuscate the criteria which the court ultimately uses to
make the evaluation. Although Judge Wyzanski's unfairness approach
differs in its quite proper rejection of subjective intent, it employs
largely the same types of evidence as the legitimate business approach,
and both share many of the same conceptual or linguistic difficulties.
This is perhaps more the fault of the language employed than the judi-
ciary, as can be seen from judicial attempts to refine further the valua-
tive terms invoked.134 Judge Wyzanski's attempt to remedy this defect
by placing specific intent on a dearer and firmer base of an ethical code
must remain unsuccessful at least until that code can be articulated and
defended.
Doubts about the sufficiency of the rational justification for many
decisions involving alleged attempts to monopolize are not removed
by referring the issue of conduct evaluation to the jury under the
broad rubric of specific intent in terms of a subjective standard.135 An
impossible burden is thereby placed on the jury to attempt to resolve
the problems of identifying, defining, and ordering the priority of the
criteria which should underlie that evaluation. 3 6
134 The Seventh Circuit has stated: "Because of its wrongful character and its poten-
tial for harm to the public, that conduct is appropriately characterized as 'predatory.'"
Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 599 (7th Cir. 1971). How-
ever, "wrongful" is no less ambiguous than "predatory."
135 For example, in Mount Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453
(W.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969),. the subjective approach, or
at least an emphasis on "purpose," was combined with purely economic criteria. At one
point the court stated that "[a]n attempt is . . . a conative effort to achieve a result" and
that "[t]he mental or volitional element is significant in the case of an attemipt." Id. at
461. But in sending the question of attempt to the jury, the court enumerated specific
economic criteria to be used in determining whether alleged predatory price cutting con-
stituted an attempt. Id. at 459-62. See also Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260 F. Supp. 193, 201
(W.D. Wash. 1966) (jury instructed that there must be preponderance of evidence that
defendant "had actual knowledge that actions taken by him would tend to cause monopo-
lization and that such person by such actions consciously desired to accomplish such
monopolization").
130 This explains why it is easier to criticize judicial formulations of specific intent
than to articulate a clear, precise, and workable definition. For example, one commentator
has criticized Judge Wyzanski's standards of "predatory" and "not honestly industrial" as
bootstrap in nature since it is the intent which makes the conduct predatory. See Blecher,
supra note 6, at 217-18. In this sense all the articulated standards or approaches are boot-
strap, including the test proposed by Blecher: "a common-sense analysis of all of the facts
and circumstances." Id. at 218. This formulation is more vague than any other approach
except the gestalt approach and might, in fact, strike some observers as a mere verbaliza-
tion of the gestalt approach.
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B. Dangerous Probability of Success
The requirement that a defendant's conduct must give rise to a
dangerous probability that actual monopolization will result before an
attempt offense is established was first stated in Swift 137 and has been
followed by the great majority of lower courts which have considered
it.138
As with definitions of specific intent, the verbal formulations of
the dangerous probability requirement vary and do not appear to affect
the decisions.1 39 Perhaps the best expression of the courts' frustration
in attempting to define the requirement is found in Campbell Dis-
137 196 U.S. at 396.
138 In the lower courts there is virtual unanimity that the plaintiff has the burden
of proving dangerous probability. See, e.g., Central Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home
Loan Bank Bd., 422 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1970); Alles Corp. v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 F.2d 567
(6th Cir. 1964); Mackey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 237 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied
per stipulation, 355 U.S. 865 (1957). Only the Ninth Circuit has rejected the requirement.
See note 73 supra; note 147 infra. The Fifth Circuit recently reserved the question in
Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972), although earlier decisions in that circuit required
a showing of dangerous probability. See, e.g., Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417
F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969); Centanni v. T. Smith & Sons, 216 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. La.), aff'd
per curiam, 323 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1963).
Many opinions do not mention the dangerous probability requirement. In most of
these cases, however, the requirement was not necessary because specific intent had not
been proved. See, e.g., Daily Press, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, 412 F.2d 126 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969); Bank of Utah v. Commercial Security Bank, 369 F.2d 19 (10th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967); Southern Blowpipe & Roofing Co. v. Chatta-
nooga Gas Co., 360 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 844 (1968). In some cases
the defendant had already attained monopoly power in terms of market share percentage.
See, e.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 801 (1962); Denver Petrol Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo.
1969); United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 205 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
Union Carbide is an excellent example of the almost cavalier attitude toward dan-
gerous probability in "mixed" cases when specific intent is present. The Tenth Circuit re-
fused to reverse a jury verdict against the defendants when the instructions omitted the
dangerous probability requirement. The circuit court held that the instructions were
adequate even though the defendants' proposed instructions, which included the require-
ment, "may have been literally correct." 300 F.2d at 586.
Dangerous probability is not necessary in cases involving natural monopolies, because
ultimately only one competitor will remain in the market. See John Wright & Associates v.
Ullrich, 328 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1964). This explains the absence of the requirement in
Union Leader.
139 Some courts merely quote the Swift language (see, e.g., Independent Iron Works,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656, 667 (9th Cir. 1963)); others speak of the
"dangerous likelihood of success" that monopoly power will result from the conduct (see,
e.g., Diamond Int'l Corp. v. Walterhoefer, 289 F. Supp. 550, 574 (D. Md. 1968)) or that the
defendant is "likely to accomplish" monopoly power. See, e.g., Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger
Co., 402 F.2d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969).
1150
ATTEMPTS TO MONOPOLIZE
tributing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.,' 40 in which the court noted
"the lack of authority" as to the "quantum of proof needed."'141 Never-
theless, certain general elements of the requirement are recognized. A
plaintiff must prove a relevant market and the defendant's share in
that market.142
The most facile method of determining dangerous probability is
to focus upon a defendant's present market share compared with the
potential share resulting from the allegedly unlawful conduct. This
method has rarely been utilized by the courts and when it has, the deci-
sions are too vague and inconsistent to make any meaningful general-
izations about its acceptability or effectiveness.143 On the other hand,
140 208 F. Supp. 523 (D. Md. 1962).
141 Id. at 529.
142 See, e.g., Deltown Foods, Inc. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y.
1963). It is often stated that the market cannot be as narrowly defined as the defendant's
own product. See, e.g., Kemwel Automotive Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 1966 Trade Cas.
71,882 (S.D.N.Y.).
143 In one case, dangerous probability was held not to have been shown when the
defendant could obtain at most 20% of the market as a result of the offensive conduct
alleged. Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 961 (1969); see Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 287 F. Supp. 143
(D. Md. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 US. 920 (1970) (3% to
4% held insufficient); ci. Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 471 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1972) (31.2%
held doubtful dangerous probability). One court found no dangerous probability when
there was a decline in market share from 52% to 51% over the conduct period. See Dia-
mond Int'l Corp. v. Walterhoefer, 289 F. Supp. 550 (D. Md. 1968). The district court in
Jerrold held that a series of vertical acquisitions which resulted in an increase of the mar-
ket share from 1.5% to 10% did not constitute an attempt, although the court stated that
further acquisitions would violate § 7 of the Clayton Act. 187 F. Supp. at 566-67. A decline
in market share from 68% to 32% was also noted in N.W. Controls, Inc. v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 333 F. Supp. 493 (D. Del. 1971), but this decline was apparently used by the
court to find a lack of specific intent rather than to find an absence of dangerous probabil-
ity. Id. at 517.
On the other hand, allegations that the defendant had 5% to 6% of the market was
held sufficient to defeat summary judgment for the defendant. See Campbell Distrib. Co. v.
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 208 F. Supp. 523, 528 (D. Md. 1962). In Clausen & Sons v.
Theodore Hamm Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 148 (D. Minn. 1967), rev'd on other grounds,
395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1968), summary judgment for the defendant was denied where a
35% to 50% share was alleged. But see McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269
F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959) (allegation of "dominant position" insufficient to state claim).
Exclusive reliance on market share percentage was condemned in Cliff Food Stores,
Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969). The circuit court affirmed the dismissal
of the complaint for lack of dangerous probability. The plaintiff had alleged that the de-
fendant Kroger was the third largest competitor in a market characterized by "extremely
competitive" conditions. Id at 207. Although the court considered percentages used in prior
actual monopolization cases, it warned that "one must be particularly wary of the num-




a broader approach was adopted in Becker v. Safelite Glass Corp.,144
in which the court required proof of the plaintiff-competitor's market
share, the portion or percentage of his business affected by the defen-
dant's conduct, the defendant's existing market share and the poten-
tial addition to it from the conduct in question, the general state of the
market, and general indicia of monopoly power.145
The dangerous probability requirement has been criticized on the
ground that it permits a competitor with little market power or one
not on the verge of attaining monopoly power to engage in predatory
or exclusionary practices without fear of liability under the attempt
prohibition. 46 Although many of these practices may be unlawful un-
der other antitrust provisions, some will escape because of statutory
requirements like the conspiracy element of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Thus, a lacuna is created through which undesirable conduct
escapes all or many of the provisions of the antitrust laws. For this
reason some commentators have urged the abolition of the dangerous
probability requirement.' 7
144 244 F. Supp. 625 (D. Kan. 1965). The defendant was relatively small compared with
"the four giants of the auto glass industry." Id. at 638.
145 Id. at 688-40. The court concluded that it was "inconceivable ... that defendants
could actually monopolize the area." Id. at 688; see B & B Oil & Chem. Co. v. Franklin
Oil Corp., 293 F. Supp. 1813, 1319 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
A different approach to dangerous probability was taken in Kearney & Trecker Corp.
v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972), in
which the circuit court appears to have lumped together specific intent and dangerous
probability under the latter heading. The court held that a dangerous probability existed
where the plaintiff: (1) had the capacity to commit the offense as shown by its share of the
market (33%) and its significant and profitable patent position; (2) intended to acquire
the power to exclude competition from a substantial share of the market as shown by its
attempt to reissue broad claim patents and its acquisition of another dominating patent;
and (3) used "predatory" conduct to accomplish that purpose. Id. at 598-99.
146 See Note, supra note 6, 1969 UTAH L. Rrv. at 709-11.
147 Id. Only the Ninth circuit, in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964), has specifically rejected this requirement. Its two-fold ra-
tionale, however, is not persuasive for several reasons. First, the circuit court reasoned that
specific intent is the only evidence of dangerous probability needed, "perhaps on the not
unreasonable assumption that the actor is better able than others to judge the practical
possibility of achieving his illegal objective." 327 F.2d at 474. But this assumption is to-
tally unreasonable. Specific intent or "illegal objective" is invariably inferred from con-
duct, not from a subjective intent to monopolize existing in the defendant's mind. Even
when there is evidence of a subjective unlawful intent, the court's assumption does not
follow because it rests on the dubious premise that an intention or a motive existing in
the mind of the actor causes his conduct. Cf. G. RYLE, THE CONC=,T OF MIND 86-89 (1949).
Second, the circuit court relied (327 F.2d at 474) on precedent which does not support
elimination of the dangerous probability requirement, since the cases cited dealt with
different factual situations. Two of the cases were "mixed" cases (Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), and Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel
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The most persuasive argument for eliminating the dangerous prob-
ability requirement is the lacuna problem, especially in light of the
policy underlying the attempt provision-to stop monopolization in its
incipiency.14 Professor Turner argues that specific intent alone is suf-
ficient evidence of an unlawful attempt because conduct accompanied
by specific intent lacks, by definition, economic or social justification.
He cites "predatory price-cutting" and "coercive refusals to sell" as ex-
amples.1 49 If conduct establishing specific intent is always without eco-
Corp., 322 F.2d 656 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963)), and the third was Griffith,
the two-market leverage case. See notes 25-35 and accompanying text supra.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit itself appears to have retreated recently from Lessig by
limiting it to attempt claims based upon "substantial daim[s] of restraint of trade" under
§ 1. See Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1972). The highly ambiguous
nature of the dangerous probability requirement was further aggravated by the court's
cryptic language in Moore v. J.H. Matthews Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.)
74,263, at 93,256 (9th Cir. Nov. 29, 1972) (citation omitted):
Finally, this court has ruled that an attempt to monopolize under section 2
does not require proof of monopoly power. Proof that there is a "dangerous prob-
ability of success" is certainly enough .... Evidence of market power is relevant,
but not indispensable to a Lessig claim.
Only two district courts outside the Ninth Circuit appear to have rejected the dan-
gerous probability requirement. See Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 5 TRAnE REG. REP. (1972 Trade
Cas.) 74,332 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 1972); McCormack v. Theodore Hamm Brewing Co., 284
F. Supp. 158 (D. Minn. 1968). See also Bowl America, Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F. Supp.
1080 (D. Md. 1969).
The most convincing criticism of Lessig's reliance on precedent can be found in Becker
v. Safelite Glass Corp., 244 F. Supp. 625, 637-38 (D. Kan. 1965). See generally Diamond Int'l
Corp. v. Walterhoefer, 289 F. Supp. 550 (D. Md. 1968). In United States v. Charles Pfizer
& Co., 245 F. Supp. 737, 739 (E.D.N.Y. 1965), the court distinguished between conspiracy to
monopolize (no market necessary) and attempt (market necessary): "The gravamen of con-
spiracy is an agreement to commit an illegal act; the gravamen of attempt is the specific
intent to commit an illegal act, but falling short of completion." Id. See also Smith, supra
note 6, at 240-41.
148 Prior to Lessig, one district court flirted with this argument but felt constrained
by the Supreme Court's holdings in Griffith and Alcoa. See Campbell Distrib. Co. v.
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 208 F. Supp. 523 (D. Md. 1962). In Campbell, the court
recognized "some persuasiveness" in the plaintiff's argument that dangerous probability
shoufd not be required because the purpose of § 2 mandated that "the beginnings of
illegal conduct should be condemned as much as the illegal end result.... [A] monopolist
must begin somewhere; his illegal ultimate objective should be nipped in the bud." Id. at
529.
It has been convincingly argued that the criminal law's concept of attempt, upon
which the dangerous probability requirement was based in Swift, is inapplicable to § 2.
See Note, supra note 6, 1969 UTAH L. REv. at 710-712. The following reasons have been
offered to support the argument: (1) Congress, in enacting the Sherman Act, relied on
pre-1890 tort and contract law with little reference to criminal law; (2) the existence of
criminal penalties under § 2 is not a persuasive justification; § 2 is more accurately a
charter to be flexibly construed than a penal statute; and (3) other criminal law terms in
the Sherman Act, such as "conspiracy," are not limited to criminal law definitions. Id.
149 Turner, supra note 6, at 305. Professor Turner also relies on language in Columbia
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nomic or social justification, the incipiency argument is very persuasive,
and the only obstacle to its acceptance is the Supreme Court's dicta in
Swift.'" ° The weakness of this argument lies in the fact that it is not
always clear what constitutes"predatory price" cutting. Furthermore,
"without economic justification" is more conclusory than descriptive.
Thus, the fundamental problem presented by attempt claims is still
unresolved-what criteria are relevant in determining which competi-
tive practices are "predatory," "unfair," "exclusionary," or "without
economic justification." Professor Turner has recognized this problem
with respect to actual monopolization; terming conduct "illegal" solves
nothing because the conduct in question is
both potentially restrictive and potentially beneficial. . . . It is
necessary to examine the economic context in which the conduct
takes place to determine whether the restrictive effects outweigh
the benefits. And typically the restrictive effects will vary directly
with the market power of the firm involved. 51
The same uncertainty exists when an attempt to monopolize is alleged
because the conduct under inquiry is the same. Professor Turner dis-
tinguishes actual monopolization from attempt on the ground that in
"the typical attempt or conspiracy case... one may readily infer that
the principal goal is aggrandizement unmerited by superiority in prod-
uct or technique."-1 52 This description is inaccurate. Often an inference
of aggrandizement cannot "readily" be made. Moreover, uncertainties
arise from the imprecise goals of the antitrust laws, particularly the
problem that competition can result in harm to competitors both in
the long and short run. This fundamental ambiguity increases the dif-
ficulty of determining when conduct has social or economic justifica-
tion or when conduct is predatory. 5 3
The dangerous probability requirement should be retained for
three reasons. First, the anticompetitive effects of restrictive business
practices increase with market power 5 4 Therefore, the degree of the
defendant's market power is directly relevant to any evaluation of its
conduct. The dangerous probability requirement is the vehicle by which
Steel to justify eliminating the dangerous probability requirement. Id. at 294. This reli-
ance, however, is misplaced. See Smith, supra note 6, at 235-37.
150 See notes 19-23 and accompanying text supra.
151 Turner, supra note 6, at 314.
152 Id. at 306.
153 Cf. J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 357-65, 462-63, (2d ed. 1968).
154 See Turner, supra note 6, at 314.
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market power and structural considerations enter the evaluation of
conduct in an attempt claim. Dangerous probability thus complements
the finding of objective specific intent. Second, the requirement serves
as an additional deterrent to hasty condemnations of conduct and prac-
tices of uncertain competitive merit or harm. Such condemnation could
easily occur in the context of determining specific intent, a determina-
tion fraught with vague and ill-defined criteria. Third, the significance
of the lacuna defect has been exaggerated. Expansion of the definition
of the "agreement" required for section 1 has significantly narrowed
the lacuna. 55 While this expansion is open to criticism as unwarranted
and troublesome, the imprecision of the attempt offense does not con-
stitute a more workable solution.
The broader approach to the dangerous probability requirement
exemplified in Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc.'5" and Becker v.
Safelite Glass Corp.157 is preferable to an exclusive reliance on the de-
fendant's market share percentages.15 8 This broader approach results
in a more accurate determination of the defendant's ability to achieve
monopoly power through the conduct in question than reliance upon
a figure of market percentage. And if, as Bain suggests, there is an iden-
tifiable historical evolution toward concentration in an oligopolistic
market,'5 9 the stage of evolution of the entire industry involved would
be relevant to any determination of dangerous probability.
The dangerous probability doctrine has not been utilized in two-
market "misuse'of monopoly power" situations. Neither Griffith nor
Otter Tail appears to require a dangerous probability of success in the
nonmonopoly market, and lower courts have not imposed a dangerous
probability requirement in Griffith situations. 60 The absence of this
requirement is justified on the grounds that the defendant already en-
joys a monopoly in one market and that it is the leverage power itself
which is allegedly the underlying evil in this situation.
155 See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 892 U.S. 134 (1968);
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
156 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969).
17 244 F. Supp. 625 (D. Kan. 1965).
158 See notes 144-45 and accompanying text supra.
159 J. BIAw, supra note 153, at 159-62.
160 See, e.g., Southern Blowpipe & Roofing Co. v. Chattanooga Gas Co., 360 F.2d 79
(6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 844 (1968); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley,
300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 801 (1962); United States v. Klearfiax
Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945); cf. Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans




DISPOSITION OF ATTEMPT CLAIMS INVOLVING RECURRING
FAcT SITUATIONS
There is a surprising consistency in the actual disposition by courts
of attempt claims despite the varying rationales and definitions utilized.
Although unanimity does not reign, certain fact situations have often
engendered the same results regardless of the rationale of the court.
At the outset, a distindtion between one-market and two-market
cases should be employed. in the former, the defendant's conduct oc-
curs in a single product and geographic market and on a single level
of the manufacturing-distribution chain except for mere sales to or pur-
chases from another level. In a two-market case, the defendant's con-
duct occurs either in more than one product or geographic market or
on more than one level of the distribution chain. Thus, conduct of a
fully integrated producer-seller almost invariably gives rise to a two-
market situation.161
A. Two-Market Situations
An unlawful attempt to monopolize has been found more fre-
quently in two-market situations than in one-market cases. In many
of the two-market cases, the attempt claim was combined with an alle-
gation of actual monopolization, and courts occasionally have found
a violation of section 2 generally without specifying a particular pro-
vision. 612 Further refinement of the two-market situation into Griffith
and non-Griffith cases is useful. A Griffith two-market situation exists
when the defendant has monopoly power in one of the markets or on one
level of the distribution chain. A violation of section 2 occurs when
this monopoly power is misused in a second market, usually to gain a
competitive advantage through the leverage resulting from its domi-
nance in the primary monopoly market. A non-Griffith situation exists
when a defendant operates in two markets or on two levels of the dis-
tribution chain but does not have monopoly power in any market or
on any level.
1. Griffith Situations
While the lower courts often have expressed indecision on whether
an attempt to monopolize or actual monopolization is the proper of-
161 Tying arrangements have been treated by the courts as one-market situations, and
are so classified here, although they involve conduct occurring in more than one product
market.
162 See, e.g., Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 869 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1966),
rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 884 (1967).
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fense, 113 Griffith situations have almost invariably been examined un-
der criteria different from those applied to attempt claims generally.0 4
This special treatment is likely to continue in the wake of Otter Tail.
The typical Griffith attempt to monopolize case involves integrated
producers with a monopoly on one level of production who engage in
supply squeezes, price squeezes, boycotts, and other conduct directly
harmful to competitors in one of the nonmonopoly markets.0 5 The
courts have displayed little hesitancy in finding an unlawful attempt
or a sufficient attempt allegation under the Griffith misuse of monopoly
power rationale. Meaningful recourse is rarely made to the Swift for-
mulation or to other familiar approaches to attempt to monopolize
claims. 16
163 See, e.g., Southern Blowpipe & Roofing Co. v. Chattanooga Gas Co., 360 F.2d 79
(6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 814 (1968); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley,
300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, D71 U.S. 801 (1962); Packaged Programs, Inc. v.
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 255 F.2d 708 (8d Cir. 1958).
164 The presence of actual monopolization combined with the allegation of leverage
power distinguishes Griffith situations from one-market cases and, to a lesser extent, from
non-Griffith two-market cases.
165 See, e.g., Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1966),
rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 384 (1967); North Texas Producer's Ass'n v. Metzger
Dairies, Inc., 348 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 977 (1966); Union Carbide
& Carbon Co. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 801 (1962);
United States v. Klearfiax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945).
10 An example of a Griffith situation is Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit
Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 1 73,813 (S.D. Tex. 1971), in which a monopolist
in one product market expanded into a related product market by launching a below-cost
operation in the second market. The defendants had 85% of the insurance credit reporting
market, 26% of the nonlocal credit reporting market, and a "dominant position" in certain
cities. Id. at 91,441. The court found actual monopolization of the principal market and an
attempt to monopolize the subsidiary market. Id. Specific intent was based primarily upon
the defendants' launching of a below-cost operation in the subsidiary market when they
knew it could not make a profit. The court viewed the expansion as a Griffith misuse of
monopoly power situation. The dangerous probability requirement was not even men-
tioned in connection with the subsidiary market.
In Jerrold, the district court applied the conventional attempt formulation and held
that forward vertical integration by a monopolist does not constitute an attempt to
monopolize. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (ED. Pa. 1960),
afl'd per curiam, 865 U.S. 567 (1961). But in a subsequent private treble damage action,
the Ninth Circuit held that Jerrold had used its dominant position in the manufacturing
market to attempt to monopolize the local CATV market in the Northwest. The court
also found unlawful concerted boycotts and tying arrangements as well as a conspiracy to
monopolize. Jerrold Electronics Corp. v. Westcoast Broadcasting Co., 341 F.2d 653 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 882 U.S. 817 (1965).
However, in Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963), the circuit court affirmed a directed verdict
for the defendant, an integrated steel producer-fabricator who had "rationed" orders to
the plaintiff-fabricator. The court reasoned that a sudden and unexpected steel shortage
occurring during a sudden increase in demand constituted a legitimate business purpose
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According to traditional antitrust theory, anticompetitive dangers
in a Griffith situation arise primarily from the leverage existing in a
monopoly market and used to gain an advantage in a second market
or distribution level.16 7 As monopoly power magnifies the anticompeti-
tive effects of restrictive business conduct or increases the potential for
abuse, a holder of such power operating in a second market or on a
different level of the distribution chain should be subject to a stricter
standard than that applied to a nonmonopolist operating either in one
or in several markets. This higher standard is embodied in the Griffith
test of misuse of monopoly power.
The restrictiveness of the Griffith test makes it preferable to any
of the conventional formulations of attempt offenses, such as specific
intent and dangerous probability. Moreover, treatment of Griffith sit-
uations as a separate problem serves the welcome purpose of focusing
attention on the controversial concept of "leverage" upon which the
courts base their severe attitudes toward Griffith situations.10 8 Recog-
nition of the Griffith misuse of monopoly power standard as a unique
offense under section 2169 would serve the dual purpose of eliminating
much of the confusion surrounding judicial treatment of attempts to
behind the rationing. Id. at 661. The court also noted that orders to all fabricators, includ-
ing the defendant's own fabricating plants, were rationed. Id. at 663. It is unclear from the
opinion whether the defendant had monopoly power in the steel production market. If
not, this case does not represent a Griffith situation.
167 See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United States
v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); E. SINGER, ANrrrRusT ECONOMICS: SELEcrED LEGAL CAsES AN
ECONOMIC MODELS 190-95 (1968).
The Griffith two-market situation may also give rise to assertedly anticompetitive
cross-subsidization, that is, the use of monopoly profits gained in the principal market to
subsidize operations in the subsidiary market. See, e.g., A. BUaNs, THE DECLINE OF COMt-
PETION 450-53 (1936); A. KAPLAN, BIG ENTERPIS IN A COMPETTVE SYSu 215 (1954).
This ill-defined concept of leverage has been employed by the courts, particularly in
the areas of tying arrangements (see, e.g., United States v. International Salt Co., 332 U.S.
392 (1947)), and vertical integration. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334
U.S. 131 (1948). As to the asserted anticompetitive effects of vertical integration, see
J. BAIN, supra note 153, at 360-62; C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 130, at 122; E.
SINGER, supra at 206-23.
168 The traditional antitrust view of leverage has been sorely criticized with respect
to tying arrangements. See, e.g., Markovits, Tie-ins, Leverage, and the American Antitrust
Laws, 80 YALE L.J. 195 (1970). See also Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957). For a criticism of leverage with respect to vertical integra-
tion, see Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 157 (1954).
169 Recently, one district court expressly recognized the distinction proposed herein
between Griffith situations and other attempt situations in which the specific intent plus
dangerous probability standard applies. See GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 329 F. Supp.
823, 829 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 463 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1972).
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monopolize as well as facilitating needed analysis and criticism of the
offense.' 70
Judicial willingness to find antitrust violations in Griffith cases
(whether or not a separate offense rationale is used) reduces the lacuna
problem in two ways. First, an integrated producer with a monopoly
on one level of the distribution chain can be held to violate section 2
even when he unilaterally practices price or supply squeezes which
would constitute offenses under section 1 except for the absence of a
conspiracy. Second, Griffith can be used to reach unilateral refusals to
deal by one holding monopoly power. 171
2. Non-Griffith Situations
In non-Griffith two-market situations' 72 -operation by a non-
monopolist in two markets or on two distribution or manufacturing
levels-the courts have largely continued to use the traditional for-
mulation of the attempt offense-specific intent plus dangerous prob-
ability in the second or subsidiary market. In employing this standard
the courts have found fewer attempts to monopolize than in Griffith
cases.
Expansion by acquisition alone, either horizontal or vertical, has
never been condemned as an attempt. 73 Offers to buy out an only com-
petitor have also been held not to constitute an attempt to monopo-
lize.' 74 Yet an attempt to monopolize was found when a horizontal
170 Further analysis and criticism of the Griffith rationale constitutes a subject
requiring extensive comment beyond the scope of the present Article.
171 Resort to Griffith may not be necessary, however, because United States v. Colgate
& Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919), prohibits unilateral refusals to deal in order "to create or
maintain a monopoly." See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273
U.S. 359 (1927). Dangerous probability is not required under either rationale. Both tests
do require some "bad" intent or purpose to monopolize. The analysis under the Colgate
exception is substantially the same as the analysis under "specific intent" of attempt to
monopolize. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 1022 (1973); Six Twenty-
Nine Prods., Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 265 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1966).
172 Absence of monopoly power is the only difference between Griffith and non-
Griffith two-market situations. Since measurement of monopoly power is not exact, it is
not always certain whether a particular case involves a Griffith situation or not. In those
areas of doubt, stricter standards, in proportion to the degree of market share involved,
might be applied to the conduct under consideration. Thus, a sliding scale test would be
employed in non-Griffith two-market situations. Any imprecision in such a scale would be
justified because of the larger anticompetitive risks arising from misuse of monopoly power
to gain an advantage in a second market.
173 See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); Bender v. Hearst
Corp., 152 F. Supp. 569 (D. Conn. 1957), aff'd on other grounds, 263 F.2d 360 (2d Cir.
1959).
174 Scott Publ. Co. v. Columbia Basin Publ., Inc., 293 F.2d 15 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 940 (1961); Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F.
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acquisition was followed by predatory conduct against a competitor and
there was no arguable economic justification for such conduct.17 A
vertical acquisition by dairy producers having fifty-.five to sixty percent
of the raw milk market was also held to constitute an attempt when it
was followed by price squeezes, geographic price discrimination, boy-
cotts, other "deceptive" practices in the wholesale milk processing mar-
ket, and acquisition of the chief competing processor. 176
The mere entrance into a second market or distribution level by
internal expansion does not constitute an attempt to monopolize the
second market. This result has been reached in cases involving geo-
graphic market expansion'177 and vertical integration. 7 8 As in acquisition
Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1959), modified, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833
(1961).
176 Bowl America, Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Md. 1969). The
predatory conduct alleged included physical harassment and removal of essential business
fies. Although the court at one point apparently rejected dangerous probability as a
requirement, the requirement was undoubtedly met anyway by the approximately 68%
market share resulting from the merger. Id. at 1091. But see Sam S. Goldstein Indus., Inc.
v. Botany Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In Goldstein, a horizontal
acquisition was followed by alleged price discrimination and groundless threats of trade-
mark enforcement suits. However, the defendants' market share was not alleged and the
court dismissed the attempt count, although it granted leave to amend the complaint.
176 Bergjans Farm Dairy Co., v. Sanitary Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Mo.
1965), aft'd, 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966). Both the district court and the circuit court,
however, viewed the case as a Griffith situation because of the defendants' dominant
position in the primary market of raw milk. The district court stated: "As a processor...
[the defendants] could use the economic power gained from this monopolistic position
in raw milk to cut the price of processed milk and to destroy profits on the sale of
processed milk by any competing processor." 241 F. Supp. at 480. The circuit court noted
that the defendants' "dominant position in raw milk production was necessarily an element
of influence in anything [they] might choose to do" and that this position "demanded
caution on [the defendants'] .. . part when [they] embarked on processing." 368 F.2d at 691.
177 Central Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 422 F.2d 504 (8th Cir.
1970); American Football League v. National Football League, 205 F. Supp. 60 (D. Md. 1962),
aff'd, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963).
178 Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 274 F. Supp. 966 (E.D. Mo. 1967), aff'd, 402 F.2d
968 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969). In Hiland Dairy, a retail chain with
8% of the retail milk market integrated backwards by building a milk processing plant
with a capacity ultimately to produce 20% of the milk processing market. Plaintiff, a
competing milk processor, alleged the construction of the plant and a subjective specific
intent to monopolize as evidence of the attempt to monopolize the subsidiary market
of milk processing. The district court found that neither specific intent nor dangerous
probability was sufficiently alleged and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim. 274 F. Supp. at 968-69. The circuit court refused to consider the case as a Griffith
two-market leverage situation. 402 F.2d at 975-76. It held that Kroger's 8% share in the
retail milk market was insufficient market power to create a dangerous probability of
monopolization of the processing market. Id. at 975. Conversely, the court noted there
was no dangerous probability of an attempt to monopolize the retail market by using milk
as a loss leader in the retail outlets because Kroger had insufficient power in the retail
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cases, however, anticompetitive conduct following internal expansion
by a nonmonopolist may constitute an attempt to monopolize the sec-
ond market. For example, a jury verdict against the defendant was
upheld when forward vertical integration by a car manufacturer was
followed by allegedly below-cost pricing and deceptive advertising
practices at the dealer level.17 9
The question arises whether the dangerous probability requirement
should be eliminated in the non-Griffith as well as the Griffith situation.
In both the crucial factor is whether sufficient leverage power exists in
the principal market to create the potential for anticompetitive effects
in the subsidiary market. A stricter attempt standard should be imposed,
however, only when this leverage danger is substantial. This danger is
certainly present in Griffith situations, but its existence is not so clear
in non-Griffith situations where power in the principal market is weaker.
Consequently, a dangerous probability of monopolization of the sub-
sidiary market resulting from expansion and post-expansion conduct
should be a necessary element in a non-Griffith two-market attempt
situation. This conclusion is reinforced when it is considered that the
attempt standards should not be so strict that entry of new competition
into subsidiary markets is inhibited or prevented.180
market to recoup losses from ruinous wholesale milk prices. Id. The circuit court also
noted the absence of any allegedly anticompetitive or unlawful conduct beyond the
expansion itself and stated that internal expansion is favored under the antitrust laws
over expansion by acquisition or joint venture. Indeed, internal expansion was said often
to be desirable since it brings a new competitor into the market. Id. at 975-76. The circuit
court further stated that the antitrust laws are designed to protect competition and not
competitors: "Plaintiffs' market shares are not protected by the anti-trust laws and they
have no legal basis for precluding competition of Kroger in their [processing] field." Id.
at 977. See generally Central Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 422 F.2d
504 (8th Cir. 1970).
179 Mount Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1968),
afTfd per curiam, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969). The district court noted (283 F. Supp. at
458) that Chrysler's forward integration resembled somewhat the "sheet squeeze" un-
lawfully employed in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945). The below-cost pricing was described as "predatory price-cutting." 283 F. Supp.
at 459.
In Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir.
1970), a full-time manufacturer of auto sealants terminated its distributorship in one
geographic area and began direct retail sales in the same area. Following the termination,
the defendant engaged in allegedly "predatory" tactics against its former distributor, e.g.,
lower prices to customers and hiring away of the distributor's top salesman who in turn
took with him the most important customers. Id. at 1337-38. In reversing a summary
judgment for the defendant, the circuit court noted that the defendant allegedly had a
monopoly or at least a dominant position in the manufacturing market. Id. at 1341-42.
Thus, the case might be viewed as a Griffith situation.
180 The attempt to monopolize provision may, however, also provide broader anti-
trust liability when practices held to be "reasonable" restraints under § 1 are nevertheless
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Dual distribution can be treated for attempt purposes as a two-
market situation.' 8 ' Either the non-Griffith or Griffith two-market test
can be applied to dual distribution cases depending upon the market
power in the primary market' s2 Dual distribution attempt claims have
infrequently appeared in the reported decisions.8 3
B. One-Market Cases
In most one-market cases the attempt to monopolize allegation
was treated as a tag-along to the plaintiff's principal claims of restraint
of trade or violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act. The most recur-
rent examples have been cases involving termination of a distributor-
ship where an attempt to monopolize is appended to the allegation of
an unlawful refusal to deal.8 4 The claim of an unlawful attempt in
these cases has rarely affected the plaintiff's recovery. Thus, when no
other antitrust violations are found, the courts have held no unlawful
attempt, treating the latter issue in a rather summary fashion. 85 And
even when other violations are found or are held to be sufficiently
alleged, many courts have still refused to find an unlawful attempt due
found to constitute an unlawful attempt. See, e.g., Mount Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrys-
ler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir.
1969). Ordinarily, however, evidence establishing "reasonableness" also establishes an
absence of specific intent to monopolize. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334
U.S. 495 (1948).
181 For a recent treatment of dual distribution, see Comment, Dual Distribution and
Attempted Monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 11 DuQUESNE L. Ray. 68
(1972).
182 See Hearings on the Impact upon Small Business of Dual Distribution and
Related Vertical Integration Before Subcomm. 4 of the House Select Comm. on Small
Business, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1591 (1963) (letter from the Justice Department):
Dual distribution can, however, become an antitrust problem. Ordinarily this
occurs in the context of a market in which integrated firms hold substantial
market power. Such power may be exercised in a particular market by the firm's
occupancy of a dominant market position or by the conglomerate power which
goes with its overall size. If market power is not present dual distribution is not
ordinarily a problem cognizable under the antitrust laws.
183 In one decision the court refused to find an attempt when a manufacturer-supplier,
in response to an express request by a customer to bid below a competing purchaser-
supplier, submitted a bid which was below the cost of the supplier. Despite the similarity
to a price squeeze, the court expressly refused to infer specific intent, probably because
the defendant's bid was in response to the customer's demand for a lower bid. See Gold
Fuel Serv., Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 306 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
951 (1963).
184 See, e.g., Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 976 (1966); notes 187-90 infra.
188 See, e.g., Daily Press, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, 412 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1969);
McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959); Holly Springs
Funeral Home, Inc. v. United Funeral Serv, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
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to an absence of conclusive proof of specific intent or dangerous prob-
ability.186
Refusal to deal cases aptly illustrate these generalizations. The
courts are virtually unanimous in holding that a refusal to deal, or a
termination and substitution of a distributor, by itself does not con-
stitute an unlawful attempt to monopolize.1 7 Some courts have rea-
soned that specific intent cannot be inferred from the refusal, usually
because an acceptable business reason or justification has been shown. 88
Lack of dangerous probability is often cited in other decisions, usually
because the cut-off dealer or distributor had a minute share of the mar-
ket.8 9 When one small distributor has simply been replaced by another,
the typical judicial reaction to an attempt claim approaches incredu-
lity.190 This attitude is ordinarily justified, for it is difficult to see how
the probability of monopolization increases simply from a substitution
of one distributor by another. Such an increase might arguably occur
where a more pliant distributor is named, but this involves the im-
position of, or agreement upon, an unlawful practice prohibited under
section 1 of the Sherman Act or section 3 of the Clayton Act.
Attempt claims are often alleged to avoid the agreement strictures
of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Ninth Circuit has tried to over-
come this conspiracy obstacle without resort to the attempt theory.191
186 See, e.g., Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1963), cert denied, 385 U.S. 976 (1966); Brewer Sewing Supplies Co. v. Fritz Gegauf, Ltd.,
1970 Trade Cas. 73,139 (N.D. Ill.).
187 E.g., Daily Press, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, 412 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1969); Walker
Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
976 (1966); Kirihara v. Bendix Corp., 306 F. Supp. 72 (D. Hawaii 1969). But see Alles Corp.
v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1964) (dismissal reversed of complaint alleging
that defendant had 50% of market and had actually monopolized as well as attempted to
monopolize).
188 See, e.g., N.W. Controls, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 333 F. Supp. 493 (D. Del.
1971). For one court's analysis of a business justification, see Hudson Sales Corp. v.
Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954) (plaintiff unable to
effectively represent defendant's products).
189 See, e.g., LS. Good & Co. v. H. Daroff & Sons., 263 F. Supp. 635 (N.D.W. Va.
1967). The court stated that the defendant had only a small share of the market and it was
"hardly conceivable that [the defendant's] refusal to sell in this case could constitute an
attempt to monopolize." Id. at 647.
190 For example, a cut-off gas station dealer asserted that his substitution and
termination was an attempt to monopolize. After noting that there were at least 18 other
Texaco dealers and at least 200 dealers of other gasolines in the area, the court declared
that it was "sheer nonsense to say that defendant terminated the lease ... in an endeavor
to eliminate competition and to gain a monopoly on the service stations in said trade
area." Alexander v. Texas Co., 149 F. Supp. 37, 44 (W.D. La. 1957).




Although the Ninth Circuit's approach also contains terms like "intent"
and "motive," it does delineate in greater detail the proof requirements
for a finding of unlawfulness. It is also preferable to the conventional
attempt standards be-cause it does not carry with it the mixed and con-
fusing baggage of attempt precedent accumulated over the years. In
sum, conduct consisting solely of allegedly unlawful refusals to deal
in a one-market situation should not be treated as an attempt to mo-
nopolize-a conclusion consistent with case law.192
The courts have not been consistent in their treatment of attempt
claims when the allegedly unlawful conduct consists solely of boycotts,
tie-ins, or exclusive dealing arrangements. Again an attempt claim
rarely adds to the plaintiff's recovery because most courts have either
refused to find an attempt or have done so only after violations of sec-
tions 1 and 3 were already established. 1 3
Failure to prove dangerous probability is the chief obstacle to
branding unlawful boycotts (even per se violations of section 1) as
attempts to monopolize,'19 4 because specific intent can be readily in-
ferred from such conduct.19 5 Cases in which concerted refusals to deal
comprise the only allegedly unlawful conduct should be examined
exclusively under the standards and precedent developed under section
1. The attempt rationale is superfluous and can only further confuse
an already complex area of the law.
The same general observations apply to tying and exclusive deal-
ing arrangements alleged to be unlawful attempts as well as violations
The critical inquiry in such "refusal to deal" cases is not whether there was
a refusal to deal, or whether a refusal to deal was carried out by agreement with
others, but rather whether the refusal to deal, manifested by a combination or
conspiracy, is so anticompetitive, in purpose or effect, or both, as to be an
unreasonable restraint of trade.... This inquiry is primarily a factual one, and
its resolution often requires determination of motive or intent.
Id. at 452.
192 For an excellent proposed approach to the problem of distributorship termina-
tions, see Buxbaum, Boycotts and Restrictive Marketing Arrangements, 64 Mini. L. Ra,.
671 (1966). Professor Buxbaum argues that the present attempt rationale obfuscates the
critical issues invloved. Id. at 686.
193 See, e.g., Christiansen Co. v. Mechanical Contractors Bid Depository, 230 F. Supp.
186 (D. Utah 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 817 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 918 (1965) (boycotts
also unlawful as conspiracy to monopolize and attempt). See generally cases cited in note
194 infra.
194 Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 976 (1966); Evening News Publ. Co. v. Allied Newspaper Carriers, 160
F. Supp. 568 (D.N.J. 1958), aff'd, 263 F.2d 715 (8d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 929 (1959).
195 See, e.g., Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp.
125, 141 (D. Mass. 1959), modified, 284 F.2d 582 (Ist Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833
(1961) (group boycott by one of two competitors in narrow market found conclusive
evidence of exclusionary intent and attempt to monopolize).
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of section I of the Sherman Act or section 3 of the Clayton Act. 96 The
courts have consistently viewed the attempt claim as a mere tag-along.197
Many courts consider section 3 of the Clayton Act narrower in coverage
than section 2 of the Sherman Act and have concluded that an arrange-
ment which does not violate section 3 cannot constitute an attempt to
monopolize. 9 8 Other courts have refused to find an attempt because of
failure to prove dangerous probability or a relevant market, 99 or be-
cause a finding of "reasonableness" under section 3 negated specific in-
tent.200 As with boycotts, conduct consisting solely of tying or exclusive
dealing arrangements should not be considered attempts to monopolize,
and the standards developed under sections 1 and 3 should be used ex-
clusively.
Few decisions have been reported where pricing practices alone
have constituted the allegedly unlawful conduct. When the practices
have been combined with other conduct, special attention has been
devoted to them 2 0 '
The courts are hesitant to find an attempt to monopolize when
below-cost pricing is alleged. 20 2 Although it is often stated that below-
190 Many tying and exclusive dealing cases arise after a refusal to deal. Therefore,
there is some overlap among the decisions.
197 This is perhaps best exemplified by United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.,
187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), in which the court
found that certain tying arrangements violated § 1 and § 3 but held that they did not
constitute unlawful attempts because of the defendants' "good faith" in maintaining them.
187 F. Supp. at 568.
198 In Campbell Distrib. Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 208 F. Supp. 523 (D. Md.
1962), the court opined that § 2's requirement may be more stringent than § 's standard
--"substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." Id. at 530. Thus,
conduct not violative of § 3 could not be held to violate § 2. Id. This rationale was also
expressed in Cayne Equip. Corp. v. Union Asbestos & Rubber Co., 1963 Trade Cas.
70,879 (S.D.N.Y.); "Mhe essence of illegality in tying arrangements is the wielding
of economic leverage to restrain a not insubstantial volume of commerce in the tied
products. A violation of Section 2 surely requires a showing of at least as much." Id.
at 78,542; see Curley's Dairy, Inc. v. Dairy Coop. Ass'n, 1962 Trade Cas. 70,200 (D. Ore.
(requirements contracts lawful under § 3 cannot violate § 2).
'99 See, e.g., McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir.
1959) (exclusive dealing arrangements); Advance Bus. Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 287
F. Supp. 143 (D. Md. 1968), al'd, 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920
(1970) (tie-ins unlawful under § 1); United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 245 F. Supp.
737 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) (exclusive dealing arrangements).
200 See Bank of Utah v. Commercial Security Bank, 369 F.2d 19 (10th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967).
201 See notes 203-10 and accompanying text infra.
202 A single price reduction was held lawful under § 1 and § 2 when it was long in
contemplation, bore a realistic relation to competitors' price changes, and corresponded
to costs of production and the defendants' decline in sales. See Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden
Farms Co., 1952 Trade Cas. 67,266 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955).
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cost pricing is predatory and raises an inference of specific intent,203
the attempt claim rarely has been successful for a number of reasons:
(1) the prices were neither below cost nor "excessively" 204 or "unrea-
sonably" low; 20 5 (2) the practices were defensive and thus justified;20
and (3) dangerous probability was not demonstrated.207 In Union
Leader,o208 for example, rate reductions were held not to constitute an
unlawful attempt unless the reductions resulted in unreasonably large
losses in the long run; otherwise, the requisite intent to inflict injury
on a competitor could not properly be inferred. 20 9
Reluctance to declare price reductions and below-cost pricing at-
tempts to monopolize is justified on three grounds: (1) price competi-
tion is a highly desirable goal, therefore low prices should not nor-
mally be discouraged; (2) predatory pricing may be a form of nonmaxi-
mizing or irrational behavior which rarely occurs and may lack signifi-
cant anticompetitive effects even when it does; 210 and (3) it is difficult
to determine the existence and effect of such pricing in a given mar-
ket.211
203 See, e.g., Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(condemning below-cost pricing as often predatory, unfair, and exclusionary).
204 See John Wright & Associates v. Ullrich, 203 F. Supp. 744 (D. Minn. 1962), aff'd,
328 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1964). Although the district court also found questionable nonpricing
conduct present in the hiring away of the plaintiff's manager and newspaper libel of the
plaintiff instigated by the defendant (203 F. Supp. at 747-48), the circuit court analyzed
the case solely in terms of the bidding practices.
205 See Scott Publ. Co. v. Columbia Basin Publ., Inc., 293 F.2d 15, 22 (9th Cir. 1961).
206 E.g., John Wright & Associates v. Ullrich, 328 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1964); Scott Publ.
Co. v. Columbia Basin Publ., Inc., 293 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1961); N.W. Controls, Inc. v.
Outboard Marine Corp., 333 F. Supp. 493 (D. Del. 1971); cf. Gold Fuel Serv., Inc. v. Esso
Standard Oil Co., 306 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
207 Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969); Allen Ready
Mix Concrete Co. v. John A. Denie's Sons, 5 TRADE REG. Rtp. (1972 Trade Cas.) 73,955
(W.D. Tenn. 1972).
208 180 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1959), modified, 284 F.2d 582 (Ist Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).
209 284 F.2d at 590. One circuit court has held that evidence of "predatory and dis-
criminatory" geographic below-cost pricing was sufficient to go to the jury as a conspiracy
to monopolize and as a concerted attempt to monopolize, but the ultimate outcome of the
claim was unclear and was apparently unfavorable to the plaintiff. See Volasco Prods. Co.
v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 389 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907
(1963). A jury verdict for the plaintiffs was reversed and the case was remanded for a new
trial because of erroneous instructions. On retrial, the jury on special interrogations found
a violation only of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman discrimination amendments. See Volasco
Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 223 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), aff'd, 346 F.2d
661 (6th Cir. 1965).
210 284 F.2d at 590.
211 See, e.g., Dewey, Competitive Policy and National Goals: The Doubtful Relevance
of Antitrust, in A. PHiLLips, PnspEervs oN ANTmuST POLIcY 78-81 (1965); Koller, The
Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 ArrTxRusr L. & ECON. REV. 105 (1971).
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Finally, conduct consisting solely of an alleged tort under state law
has been alleged in many cases. This has generally been held not to con-
stitute an attempt to monopolize. 212
C. "Bundle" Cases
A large number of reported decisions deal with conduct consisting
of a "bundle" of practices which together are alleged to constitute an
unlawful attempt to monopolize. 213 As in single practice cases, dan-
gerous probability has been the principal impediment to recovery
when the defendant's share in the relevant market has not been alleged
or proved. Attempt claims have been dismissed on this ground even
though the alleged conduct and practices consisted of per se restraints
of trade, violations of section 3 of the Clayton Act, and common law
torts. 214 If dangerous probability is proved 2 1 5 or is not required,216
See generally, Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments, 15 J. LAW & EcoN. 129
(1972).
One court has noted: "[P]rice cutting, as distinguished from price discrimination, is
a competitive practice not prohibited by the antitrust laws in the absence of special cir-
cumstances .... Bond Distrib. Co. v. Carling Brewing Co., 32 F.R.D. 409, 413 (D. Md.
1963).
212 In Keco Indus., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 5 TRADE REG. RE'. (1972 Trade Cas.)
73,808 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 1972), summary judgment on claims of actual and attempted
monopolization was granted to the defendants when trade disparagement was the sole con-
duct alleged. Cf. Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 236 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1956).
But see Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 302 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
In Smith-Victor, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had expended huge advertising
sums to disparage the plaintiff and to misrepresent the defendant's product. The defen-
dant was also alleged to have temporarily reduced prices "to clog the channels of distribu-
tion ahead of normal peak sales." Id. at 313. In denying summary judgment for the de-
fendant, the court expressed serious doubts as to the validity of the attempt theory but
felt bound by the liberal federal pleading rules. After noting that "discovery in anti-trust
cases can be very expensive" (id. at 314), the court limited discovery to determining
"whether the defendant controls a share of the relevant market which could give rise to a
conclusion that it has the power to monopolize that market." Id. (emphasis added).
In Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970), the district court held that the defendant's intentional and
deliberate libel of the plaintiff's product and misrepresentation as to its own product
constituted trade libel, a violation of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act (§ 43(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (1970), and an unlawful attempt to monopolize. The circuit court reversed on
all grounds, holding that, with respect to the attempt claim, there was no evidence of
specific intent or proof of the relevant market. 415 F.2d at 1284. The circuit court also
held that the state tort claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that the Lanham
Act was not applicable under the facts. Id. at 1281-84.
213 See notes 214-18 infra.
214 The most blatant example is Mackey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 237 F.2d 869 (7th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied per stipulation, 355 U.S. 865 (1957), in which the court dismissed
the complaint for failure to state a claim under either § 1 (unilateral conduct only) or
§ 2, holding that neither specific intent nor dangerous probability had been sufficiently
alleged. The court did, however, characterize the following conduct as "reprehensible"
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the courts have been more disposed to find an unlawful attempt in
bundle cases than in single conduct cases. 217
The distinction between bundle and single conduct cases is lessened
when each aspect of the defendant's conduct is considered separately
and specific intent is inferred from a single practice.218 Since the gestalt
approach focuses more on the defendant's conduct as a whole rather
than on an evaluation of each individual practice, a bundle allegation
appears more likely to be upheld if the gestalt approach is used. This
combination of bundle claims and gestalt jury instructions has given
rise to criticism of alleged misuse of the attempt theory. 219
and "predatory": localized below-cost price cutting, threats of refusals to deal to induce
breach of contract, misrepresentations and trade libel, and palming-off. Id. at 873-74.
Similarly, in Brewer Sewing Supplies Co. v. Fritz Gegauf, Ltd., 1970 Trade Cas. 73,139
(N.D. ill.), the court dismissed the attempt count for lack of specific intent and relevant
market allegations. The conduct consisted of alleged refusals to deal, price-fixing, terri-
torial market division, and misappropriation of trade secrets. See also Becker v. Safelite
Glass Corp., 244 F. Supp. 625 (D. Kan. 1965) (summary judgment based on failure to allege
defendant's market power despite alleged exclusive dealing arrangements, price discrimina-
tion, and unlawful promotional allowances).
215 In Clausen & Sons v. Theodore Hamm Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 148 (D. Minn.
1967), rev'd, 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1968), summary judgment for the defendant was denied
in the face of an allegation that the defendant had 35% to 50% of the relevant market and
had imposed resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing and tying contracts, territorial
restrictions, price discrimination, and discriminatory credit terms.
In natural monopoly situations, dangerous probability is not material and a mere
bundle of allegedly unlawful practices will probably be held to constitute an attempt.
See, e.g., Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125 (D.
Mass. 1959), modified, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 865 U.S. 83 (1961) (boy-
cotts, solicitations of customers by advertisers who failed to disclose principal, and secret
discriminatory advertising rates).
If a defendant has sufficient market power to constitute a nionopoly, dangerous prob-
ability is an actuality. For example, in Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 648(8th Cir. 1957), liability was imposed upon the defendant newspaper publisher which had
95% of the St. Louis market and had threatened to refuse to take ads and to cancel
desirable space, entered into tie-ins with its radio station, tied together sales of its two
daily newspapers, imposed unit advertising, and purchased the assets of a competitor
indispensable to a new entrant.
216 See Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 933
(1964).
217 In Big Value Stamp Co. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 1967 Trade Cas. 1 71,978
(S.D. Ohio), summary judgment for the defendant was denied because specific intent could
be inferred from the following practices: false advertising, attempts by the defendant to
control the terms and conditions upon which suppliers sold to the defendant and its
competitors, and interference by the defendant with the valuations which the plaintiff
placed upon the merchandise in its catalog.
218 See Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125
(D. Mass. 1959), modified, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 865 U.S. 833 (1961).
219 See Hibner, supra note 6, at 178-77.
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D. Patent and Trademark Cases
Certain practices involving patents and trademarks have been
brought within the attempt offense prohibition. A typical example is
the allegation that patent cross-licensing and pooling agreements con-
stitute patent misuse and violations of the antitrust laws.220 The courts
do not use the conventional attempt formulation and often fail even
to cite attempt precedent. They appear to view these patent and trade-
mark cases as sui generis, arising under section 2 of the Sherman Act,
without any analysis or discussion of which particular provision of sec-
tion 2 is applicable.221
In some of these cases the attempt claim was unnecessary because
the defendant enjoyed monopoly power in the relevant market and
actual monopolization provided a sufficient basis for imposing liabil-
ity.222 Even when the defendant had not yet attained monopoly power
in the relevant market, unlawful attempts have been found without
any resort to the dangerous probability requirement.223
When the conduct involves cross-licensing and pooling agreements,
the test is usually stated in terms of an unlawful intent or purpose to
monopolize or to unlawfully use the patents.224 A more specific test is
applied when infringement suits or threats of litigation are involved.
If such suits are brought in bad faith and not in an honest belief of
infringement, an unlawful attempt to monopolize is found.225 Again,
no dangerous probability requirement is imposed.226
220 See, e.g., Switzer Bros. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 851 (1962); Lynch v. Magnavox Co., 94 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1938); Clapper v. Original
Tractor Cab Co., 165 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. Ind. 1958), aff'd in part, 270 F.2d 616 (7th Cir.
1959).
221 For example, in Switzer Bros. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 851 (1962), the court held that patent pyramiding, exclusive dealing and tying
arrangements, and institution of frivolous trademark and patent infringement suits vio-
lated § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act. The court briefly discussed the conduct as an attempt
to monopolize but concluded by combining "attempt" with "tending to create a monopoly."
Id. at 42.
2 2 See Clapper v. Original Tractor Cab Co., 165 F. Supp. 565, 577 (S.D. Ind. 1958),
aff'd in part, 270 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1959) ("dominant position" and "virtual control" of
defendant). Some courts do not define the market beyond the patent itself. See Switzer
Bros. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 851 (1962).
223 See Lynch v. Magnovox, 94 F.2d 883, 890 (9th Cir. 1938) (defendants had no "sub-
stantial dominance or exclusion" in radio loud-speaker market).
224 Clapper v. Original Tractor Cab Co., 165 F. Supp. 565, 576-77 (S.D. Ind. 1958),
aff'd in part, 270 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1959); see Lynch v. Magnovox, 94 F.2d 883, 887 (9th Cir.
1938).
225 E.g., La Salle Street Press, Inc. v. McCormick & Henderson, Inc., 445 F.2d 84 (7th
Cir. 1971); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 71 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1934); American TCP
Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 127 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). But see International Visible Sys.
Corp. v. Remington-Rand, Inc., 65 F.2d 540 (6th Cir. 1933).
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Because the conventional attempt precedent is not relied upon,
these patent cases are totally different from the ordinary attempt cases.
The elimination of the dangerous probability requirement results in
a far more prohibitive standard, which is justified to some extent by
the monopoly power inherent in patents. Furthermore, the typical
patent case involves the use (or abuse) of the patent as leverage to ob-
tain a competitive advantage similar to the leverage power condemned
in Griffith. However, the patent or trademark may be examined in the
context of a broader relevant market in which the offending patentee
or licensee does not enjoy substantial or even significant market power.
A court which emphasizes proof of a relevant market over the unique-
ness of the patent may be more likely to require that conventional
attempt tests be met than to consider the patent-trademark case unique
and the dangerous probability standard inapplicable. 27
CONCLUSION
Although attempt claims have infrequently increased a party's re-
lief or recovery, the attempt offense remains an important though ill-
defined enforcement weapon. Recovery may be triggered by a jury
acting under broad instructions. Thus, the claim can be a misfiring
blunderbuss which has lain hidden in the thicket of protracted anti-
trust litigation. This unpredictability is caused in part by the specific
intent requirement which obscures the gravamen of the attempt offense
-an evaluation of business conduct in light of the structural char-
226 But see Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Prods. Co. (8th Cir. March 80, 1973), noted in
609 ATRR A-15 (April 17, 1978) (definition of market necessary).
227 See Diamond Int'l Corp. v. Walterhoefer, 289 F. Supp. 550 (D. Md. 1968). In
Diamond, the defendant counterclaimed that the plaintiff had monopolized and attempted
to monopolize by committing fraud on the Patent Office and by instituting four infringe-
ment suits. Treating the case as a conventional attempt situation, the court held that
dangerous probability was required but was not proved in view of the decline in the
plaintiff's market share over an eight-year period. The allegations concerning the four
infringement suits were apparently disregarded or given scant attention by the court.
Diamond is analagous to Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.,
882 U.S. 172 (1965); both belong to a particular category of cases involving frauds against
the Patent Office. Separation of Walker-type cases from the general group of patent-trade-
mark cases is necessary because the Supreme Court did not make it clear in Walker
whether actual monopolization or attempt to monopolize, or both, was the relevant offense.
Lower courts also appear to treat Walker situations as sui generis, an undifferentiated § 2
offense. But see Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579 (7th Cir.
1971). In Kearney & Trecker, the court applied the dangerous probability requirement
and held that an attempt to monopolize occurred when the plaintiff procured a reissue of
a patent upon hiring a retiring Patent Office examiner involved in the issuance of the
original patent. The court analogized the case to the Walker situation. Id. at 599.
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acteristics of the industry. Specific intent is also the vehicle by which
courts have resolved attempt claims without articulating the criteria
underlying the evaluation of conduct.228 Moreover, the elusive concept
of subjective intent has clouded the analysis. For these reasons, recon-
sideration of the specific intent requirement is imperative.
Any reformulation of the attempt offense should be consistent
with the theory underlying the completed offense of actual monopo-
lization. Since monopoly power alone is insufficient to constitute actual
monopolization, 229 the attempt offense should not prohibit an attempt
merely to attain monopoly power. The essential inquiry in both actual
monopolization and attempts to monopolize is an evaluation of conduct.
With monopolization, this evaluation is directed toward a finding of
behavior which, when combined with the structural requirement of
monopoly power, constitutes the offense. In attempt claims, the dan-
gerous probability requirement supplies the structural considerations.
This comparison of the attempt offense with actual monopoliza-
tion compels the conclusion that antitrust's ghost in the machine 2 30
228 Failure to articulate the criteria underlying the evaluation of conduct raises serious
questions as to the sufficiency of the rationale for many decisions involving attempt to
monopolize daims. The bases for decisions should be specifically delineated in order to
provide guidance to the practicing attorney and to the bench in future controversies.
Articulated rules and principles serve the important function of placing limits on judicial
discretion and decision making. For a discussion of the relationship between principled
decision making and judicial discretion, see R. WASSERTROm, TIE JuDiciAL DECISION (1961);
Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 14 (1967).
220 Some undesirable conduct is necessary to differentiate the offense of actual mo-
nopolization from the bare existence of monopoly power. This conduct or "plus" factor
has been described as consisting of restraints of trade or exclusionary practices. See, e.g.,
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
The "plus" factor or undesirable conduct element has been enunciated in a negative
fashion-monopolization is absent when monopoly power results solely from superior skill,
superior products, natural advantages (including accessibility to raw materials or markets),
economic or technological efficiency (including scientific research), low margins of profit
permanently maintained without discrimination, or licenses conferred by law. Id. The
Supreme Court has recently defined the offense of monopolization as: (1) monopoly power
and "(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or his-
torical accident." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
230 The phrase "ghost in the machine" is borrowed from Ryle, The Concept of
Mind. Ryle refers to the Cartesian dichotomy of "mind" and "body" as "'the dogma
of the Ghost in the Machine'" (id. at 15-16) and rejects the notion of volition as operations
of the mind by which it gets its ideas translated into action:
It [the rejected notion of volition] is just an inevitable extension of the myth of
the ghost in the machine... Mo say that a person pulled the trigger intention-
ally is to express at least a conjunctive proposition, asserting the occurrence of one
act on the physical stage and another on the mental stage; and, according to most
versions of the myth, it is to express a causal proposition, asserting that the bodily
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subjective specific intent-should be laid to rest. Subjective specific
intent is defined here as an intention existing in the mind of the actor.
A subjective intent to acquire monopoly power or to monopolize is
irrelevant if monopoly power alone continues not to constitute the
completed offense of actual monopolization. Furthermore, a subjective
intent to monopolize is superfluous when an intent to monopolize is
alleged. An actor cannot be said to intend to monopolize if the objec-
tive of his intention-monopolization-exists only after a judicial
evaluation that certain conduct is undesirable ("plus" conduct). Thus,
even subjective intention to monopolize cannot be found to exist prior
to an evaluation of conduct.
Nevertheless, evidence of business purpose is not irrelevant. Pur-
pose is relevant as evidence of the business and economic circumstances
in which the conduct is evaluated. Indeed, the great majority of so-
called subjective evidence in attempt cases has consisted of business
reasons or asserted economic justifications and not of declarations of
intent to achieve a monopoly or drive a competitor out of business.231
A more radical proposal is to replace the specific intent require-
ment with a verbal formulation which does not denote or connote
"intention," thus eliminating many of the unwanted side effects. In-
tention does not play the same role in the attempt to monopolize
offense as it does in the ordinary criminal attempt, as evidenced by the
relationships to the completed offenses. The conduct constituting the
offense of arson, for example, has been dearly defined and ordinarily
little or no evaluation of that conduct by the court is necessary or
proper.232 Similarly, an alleged attempt to commit arson requires no
act of pulling the trigger was the effect of a mental act of willing to pull the trig-
ger.
Id. at 63.
231 A subjective intention to destroy a competitor should be treated like a subjective
intention to monopolize. In both instances, the crucial issue is the manner (i.e., the con-
duct) in which the competition is destroyed-how the monopoly is acquired-and not the
intent with which the acts are committed.
The argument that the subjective intention of the actor has some relevance, at least
when the conduct lies in a twilight zone between tolerated behavior and that behavior
deemed undesirable, is of dubious merit in light of the almost exclusive reliance upon a
behavioral-structural approach to attempts to monopolize. Any relevance of a subjective
intention to monopolize or to drive a competitor out of business is minimal and out-
weighed by the inevitable obfuscation of the primary focus of inquiry--the evaluation of
conduct.
232 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE §§ 150.00-20 (McKinney 1967). The extent of judicial
evaluation of the conduct said to comprise the completed offense varies with the precision
and detail of the legislative definition. While some statutory construction may occur in the
more usual criminal offenses such as arson, it is significantly and radically more limited
than the evaluation compelled by § 2s totally undefined reference to "monopolize, or
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evaluation of conduct beyond a determination that overt acts have
occurred in some temporal proximity to the completed offense. The
defendant's intention is relevant only to the nearness and possibility
of completion. On the other hand, the conduct constituting the com-
pleted offense of actual monopolization is not well-defined and, indeed,
monopolization cannot be determined until after a judicial evaluation
of that conduct in a particular case. The same evaluation must be made
with respect to alleged attempts to monopolize. The defendant's sub-
jective intent is irrelevant to both evaluations, and specific intent
should be banished to the Valhalla of legal fictions that create more
confusion than clarity.28 In fact, the place of intent in the criminal
law itself is under increasing challenge; 234 thus, the wisdom of its con-
tinued acceptance as part of the formulation of the attempt to monop-
olize offense is weakened further.2 5
Reformulation of the specific intent requirement would serve to
concentrate attention on the criteria used in the evaluation of conduct.
The economic and political criteria now employed are frequently im-
attempt to monopolize ... any part of . .. trade or commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
Thus, the distinction between § 2 offenses and other criminal law definitions remains
valid and important.
233 In this sense, both the general intent required for actual monopolization and the
specific intent required for attempts to monopolize are fictions. General intent is often
defined as intending the foreseeable consequences of one's action. See United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1945).
234. Use of the term "intent" in criminal law has received much criticism and careful
analysis in recent years. For example, H.L.A. Hart has argued that characterization of an
act as "intentional" arises only with respect to excluding certain excusing conditions such
as mistake and accident. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, reprinted in
A. FLmv, LoGic AND LANGUAGE, FIRST SERIES 145 (1952). The Model Penal Code omits the
term "intent" from its definition of an attempt. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962).
Moreover, the doctrine of mens rea does not prevent imposition of criminal sanctions
for an attempt to monopolize. First, the mens rea requirement rests on the principle that
only voluntary actions should be punished; claims of attempt to monopolize are based on
voluntary conduct and are "intentional" in the mens rea sense. Second, the concept of
absolute criminal liability could be employed. Intent, particularly general intent, is a
fiction introduced as an element of § 2 offenses, perhaps to salve the jurisprudential con-
sciences of those clinging to the principle that some intent or mens tea is necessary before
criminal sanctions can be imposed. However, absolute liability is not an unknown doctrine
in Anglo-American criminal law and no jurisprudential obstacles exist to the elimination
of general and specific intent as elements of Sherman Act offenses. Cf. H.L.A. HART, PUN-
isHmENT AND REsPONSiBmrry 31-32, 152 (1968). But cf. Thalberg, Hart on Strict Liability
and Excusing Conditions, 81 ETHIcs 150 (1971) (distinction between strict liability offenses
and those in which courts investigate states of mind exaggerated).
238 For a discussion of intention, see G. ANSCOMBE, INrENTION passim (1957); A.
GOLDmAN, A THEORY OF HuMAN AcriON 49-85 (1970). For a criticism of the philosophical
literature and a defense of the place of intention in criminal law, see G. WULiAms, THE
MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRT1E passim (1965).
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precise and often inconsistent as applied to particular fact situations.
The difficulty of the evaluation is compounded when amorphous and
subjective judicial notions of ethical criteria are employed, as for
example, standards of unfairness which rest ultimately on an undis-
closed business morality.
A clear, precise, and well-detailed formulation of the attempt of-
fense must overcome two obstacles. First, any final formulation must
await identification and perhaps reconciliation of the policies and cri-
teria underlying section 2 of the Sherman Act.236 Second, the philoso-
phies ultimately found to underlie the evaluation of a monopolist's
conduct may be incapable of reconciliation. Thus, the articulation of
sufficiently detailed and clear instructions to the jury will be difficult.
Nevertheless, it is essential that the jury's decision take place in a con-
text free from such misleading linguistic conundrums as the specific in-
tent formulation.
In the interim, the standards used to evaluate the "plus" conduct
in actual monopolization cases should replace specific intent instruc-
tions to the jury in attempt cases.237 This replacement has the double
advantage of eliminating the unwanted side effects associated with
specific intent and of reconciling the attempt offense with the com-
pleted offense of actual monopolization.
The dangerous probability requirement should be retained since
it complements the behavioral element of the offense as the vehicle
by which the defendant's market power and other structural factors
are evaluated.238 The dangerous probability requirement also serves
as an additional protection from hasty condemnations of those business
practices demonstrating ambivalent competitive merit or harm.
Finally, Griffith two-market situations should continue to be ex-
236 It is arguable whether this has been sufficiently accomplished for actual monopo-
lization in view of the breadth and vagueness of terms like "business acumen" and "his-
torical accident." See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
237 It must be conceded, unfortunately, that jury instructions in actual monopoliza-
tion cases are often inconsistent or unclear and do not always reflect the division of the
actual monopolization offense into neat compartments of monopoly power and "plus"
conduct as proposed herein. See, e.g., ABA, ANTrrRusT CIVr JURY INsrRUcIoNs 97-103
(1972).
238 Professor Mason has criticized the proposition that intent can be inferred solely
from conduct on the ground that important structural factors (notably a defendant's mar-
ket power) are omitted. See Mason, Preface to C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 130,
at xiii-xv. The dangerous probability requirement supplies these structural factors so that
both conduct and structure are considered when an attempt to monopolize is alleged.
Moreover, introduction of structural criteria through the separate dangerous probability
requirement has the additional advantage of minimizing confusion between the conduct
and structure elements. See id. at xv.
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amined separately without resort to either the traditional Swift test and
its variants or the proposed replacement.
In view of the somewhat anarchic state of the law of attempts to
monopolize, perhaps the Supreme Court will, at the first appropriate
opportunity, address itself to the attempt offense and its underlying
criteria and policies. Only then can the attempt provision of section 2
become a more predictable enforcement weapon.
